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Abstract
In the first chapter of the dissertation, parental mortality is associated with a range of
negative child outcomes. This paper studies the effect of paternal mortality on children’s
health and schooling outcomes using the universe of veterans’ children born in Croatia,
and all of the paternal deaths and injuries resulting from the 1991-1995 Croatian-Serbian
war. Using linked administrative data, I find large negative effects of paternal death on
high-school GPA, school absences, behaviour problems, and hospitalisations. I address
potentially non-random selection into paternal death by using within-military unit dif-
ferences in the extent of injury or death, essentially assuming that the members of a
military unit all had similar probabilities of being killed or injured because they fought
in the same battles. I am also able to shed light on an important mechanism underlying
the estimated effects. Surviving spouses of those killed or injured were well compensated,
so that the death of a father did not have a negative effect on household incomes. I find
that a death or injury that occurred during the in-utero period has much larger effects
than a death or injury in early childhood, suggesting that much of the negative effect is
due to maternal stress.
In the second chapter, we answer the following research question. How important is
intergenerational transmission of political values for sustaining ethnic divisions and na-
tionalism? We implement a novel empirical strategy for identifying and studying a strong
form of nationalism—the willingness to fight and die in a war for national independence—
using name choices corresponding to previous war leaders. Based on data on almost half
a million soldiers, we first show that having been given a first name that is synonymous
with the leader(s) of the Croatian state during World War II predicts volunteering for ser-
vice in the 1991-1995 Croatian war of independence and dying during the conflict. Next,
we use the universe of Croatian birth certificates and the information about nationalism
conveyed by first names to suggests that in ex-Yugoslav Croatia, nationalism was on a
continuous rise starting in the 1970s, consistent with Fearon and Laitin (2003), and that
its rise was curbed in areas where concentration camps were located during WWII. We
also link the nationalist values we proxy using first name choices to right-wing voting
behavior in 2015, 20 years after the war. Our evidence on intergenerational transmission
of nationalism is consistent with the trade-off between within-family and society-wide
transmission channels of cultural values proposed by Bisin and Verdier (2001) and it
suggests a mechanism that sustains elevated parochial altruism across generations.
In the third chapter, we ask whether the long-term health costs of combat experience
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are larger for soldiers exposed to higher risk of dying, i.e., to higher killed-in-action
(KIA) rates of their units. We study the overall mortality effects and also focus on the
suicide effects over a 20-year post-war period using data on all veterans of the 1991-1995
Croatian war for independence. The length of combat service predicts suicide risks, as
does the exposure to psychological shocks such as the maximum experienced monthly
unit-specific KIA rate. In the second part of the analysis we ask how war-related suicides
affect the children of veterans and find significant negative effects on GPA, school absence
and school behaviour. Comparing the children of soldiers who served within the same
unit, we approximate the amount of psychological shock that each soldier experienced.
Subsequently, we analyse the connection between selection into suicides and children’s
outcomes by comparing two groups of children: those whose fathers died from natural
causes and those whose fathers committed suicide, in the post-war period. We find no
differences in children’s GPA across the two groups,. We find a significant difference
in children’s performance on high-stakes exams, where outcomes can determine future
life trajectories. Remarkably, the children of veterans who committed suicide have lower
scores on high school state exams than the children of veterans who died of natural
causes. These findings are evidence how war costs are transmitted from one generation





V prvni kapitole disertacni prace umrtnost rodičů je spojena s řadou negativních vlivů na 
dítě. Tento článek pojednává o vlivu otcovské úmrtnosti na zdraví dětí a jejich školní výsledky. 
Studované skupiny jsou děti veteránů narozených v Chorvatsku a všechna úmrtí a úrazy otců, 
které vyplynuly z chorvatsko-srbské války v letech 1991-1995. S využitím propojených 
administrativních dat jsem našel velký negativní vliv otcovy smrti na studijní průměr na střední 
škole, školní absence, problémy s chováním a hospitalizace. Problém potenciálně nenáhodné 
otcovské úmrtnosti řeším použitím rozdílů v rozsahu úrazů nebo smrti uvnitř vojenských 
jednotek. V podstatě předpokládám, že všichni členové jedné vojenské jednotky mají podobnou 
pravděpodobnost úmrtí nebo zranění, protože bojovali ve stejných bitvách. Také jsem schopen 
nastínit důležitý mechanismus, který je základem odhadovaných efektů. Přeživší manželky těch, 
kteří byli usmrceni nebo zraněni, byly dobře odškodněny, takže smrt otce neměla negativní vliv 
na příjmy domácností. Zjistil jsem, že úmrtí nebo zranění, ke kterým došlo během in utero (před 
narozením dítěte), mají mnohem větší účinky než úmrtí nebo zranění v raném dětství, což 
naznačuje, že většina negativních vlivů je důsledkem stresu matek. 
Je mezigenerační předávání politických hodnot důležité pro dlouhodobé udržování 
etnických rozdílů a nacionalismu ve společnosti? V tomto článku implementujeme novou 
strategii pro identifikaci a studium silné formy nacionalismu--ochoty zemřít v boji za vlast ve 
válce o národní nezávislost. Využíváme půl milionu záznamů o vojácích zapojených na 
chorvatské straně do války mezi Chorvatskem a Srbskem z let 1991-1995. Naše strategie je 
založena na tom, že muži, jejichž křestní jméno koresponduje s jménem vůdce Chorvatska 
v průběhu druhé světové války, vykazují statisticky větší pravděpodobnost, že budou ve válce o 
nezávislost dobrovolníky, a že v ní zahynou v boji. Volbu křestního jména tak interpretujeme 
jako nepřesný, ale statisticky silný signál o hodnotách, které rodiče vkládají svým dětem. Dále 
používáme všechny rodné listy mužů narozených v Chorvatsku od roku 1930 ke sledování 
vývoje popularity nacionalistických jmen. Naše analýza implikuje nárůst nacionalismu 
v Chorvatsku od roku 1970 a omezení tohoto nárůstu v místech, kde byly za druhé světové války 
umístěny koncentrační tábory. Dále ukazujeme, že signál volby křestího jména koreluje 
s pravicovým volebním chováním v parlamentních volbách v roce 2015, dvacet let po válce. 
x%
Konečně ukazujeme, že mezigenerační předávání nacionalistických jmen je v souladu s predikcí 
modelu Bisin and Verdier (2001) citlivé na regionální rozdíly v úrovni nacionalismu. 
V tomto článku se ptáme, zda zdravotní dopady válečných zážitků vojáků sledované po 
ukončení války jsou silnější pro ty vojáky, kteří byli vystaveni vyššímu riziku, že padnou v boji, 
tj. v těch jednotkách, kde v průběhu války zahynulo více vojáků. Sledujeme celkovou mortalitu a 
také riziko sebevražd u chorvatských veteránů války za nezávislost z let 1991-1995 v průběhu 
dvaceti let po ukončení války. Pravděpodobnost sebevražd závisí na celkové délce aktivní služby 
v průběhu války i na tom, zda byli veteráni v aspoň jednom měsíci služby vystaveni velmi 
vysokému riziku, že padnou v boji. V druhé části analýzy sledujeme, jaké dopady mají 
sebevraždy veteránů na školní prospěch a docházku jejich dětí. Porovnáváme děti, kterým zemřel 
otec z přirozených příčin s dětmi, kde otec spáchal sebevraždu a ukazujeme, že největší rozdíly 
jsou v úspěšnosti dětí v nejdůležitejších (stresujících) zkouškách typu maturitních zkoušek. Naše 
analýzy ukazuje na dodatečné náklady válečných zážitků. 
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Nationalism is an infantile disease. It is the measles of mankind.
Albert Einstein
The dissertation consists of three essays investigating how wars and civil conflicts af-
fect children’s long-run human capital accumulation through different set of mechanisms
and how nationalistic values are made more salient during wartime. A growing body of
research suggests that adverse conditions in early childhood may have particularly nega-
tive long term effects. For a young child, the loss of a parent is a traumatic event that
can affect the child through multiple channels. The importance of a father’s presence in
child development has been studied in different contexts and all show that fathers have
a significant effect on children’s outcomes. The earliest contribution of fathers is already
visible during infanthood; numerous research studies (Rowe et al. 2004; Yogman et al.
1995) show that a father’s interaction with a child has a positive effect on cognitive de-
velopment. The same effect continues during school age on quantitative and verbal skills
(Goldstein, 1982), school performance (Astone and McLanahan; 1991), and values and
attitude towards school (Alfaro et al. 2006). While the role of the father’s involvement in
child development has been extensively studied, less research has been devoted to study-
ing the effects of the lack of a father’s presence, because of methodological concerns and
lack of quality data.
The first chapter estimates the causal effect of the loss of a father on children’s out-
comes by using several novel empirical approaches. I use data from a unique setting: the
1991-1995 Serbo-Croatian war, to compare the outcomes of children whose fathers served
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in the same unit and thus were exposed to a similar risk of death. This strategy captures
unobserved elements of the endogenous part of war exposure that are correlated both
with the probability of dying and children’s long-run outcomes. Further, I use a quasi
random variation in which the state of being killed or seriously injured is exogenous to
an individual. In the second part of the paper, I focus on the prenatal and postnatal
consequences of a father’s death on children’s outcomes, and disentangle the effect of each
channel of effect.
The second chapter studies the changes in social values during wartime. Nationalism
has been a principle driver of wars and of political violence throughout modern history,
particularly in the Balkans (Petersen, 2002; Biondich, 2011). Wars, in turn, have dra-
matic, long-lasting effects on a country’s political, cultural, and ethnic identity, according
to a recent body of work based in large part on voting behavior (Mayhew, 2004; Bellows
and Miguel, 2009; Anderlini et al., 2010; Petersen, 2012; Fontana et al., 2016, Ochsner
and Roesel, 2016). Experiencing war also strengthens in-group cooperation and altruism
towards members of one’s group (Choi and Bowles, 2007; Voors, et al., 2012; Bauer et
al., 2016), i.e., preferences supportive of nationalism. A key unanswered question in the
literature is to what extent the persistence of the effects that wars have on political values
and in-group cooperative behavior is underpinned by intergenerational transmission of
values within families.
In this paper we implement a novel empirical strategy for identifying and studying
nationalism and its intergenerational transmission based on child name choices corre-
sponding to war leaders(Throughout the paper, we could have alternatively used the
term patriotism for the values we study). Such indirect approach is particularly applica-
ble in countries that feature a sharply divided ethnic mix and in settings where leaders’
names are notoriously associated with their political beliefs. Given the widespread avail-
ability of birth certificate records, the approach naturally lends itself to the study of
intergenerational transmission and is available in many historical settings. Importantly,
our approach allows us to measure a strong form of nationalism—the willingness to fight
and die in a war for national independence—that is in principle difficult to elicit in sur-
veys. This trait is of substantive interest to nations dealing with free-riding in active war
service.
The third chapter is concerned with the intergenerational transmission of war related
costs. Wars have long-term costs that reach far beyond their ceasefire date. The physical
and mental health consequences of war experiences for soldiers are a critical component of
2
the overall evaluation of war costs. They are also important for the design of public health
systems in which the prime goal is the long-term health of veterans (e.g., Boscarino, 2006).
The literature on veterans of major armed conflicts highlights the relevance of combat
experience for post-war health outcomes. For example, Cesur et al. (2013) suggest that
deployment to combat zones, and exposure to enemy fire and to death, raise the risk of
suicide ideation in the post-war period. A key feature of combat experience is that of a
military unit, possibly of a small group of co-soldiers with whom one often forms strong
social bonds under fire. Our research allows us to track soldiers who served in the same
unit during different periods and estimate the magnitude of their social bonds as well as
the magnitude of war carnage each person experienced.
In the second part of the paper, we ask whether and how these psychological costs
of war transfer to the next generation via families of veterans. We find that the largest
effect is on veterans’ children. The children of veterans who committed suicide after the
war have worse GPA, school behaviour, national exam results and are more often absent
from school than the children of veterans who served in the same unit, but who did not
commit suicide. By comparing the children of soldiers who served within the same unit,
we confine our analysis to veterans who experienced approximately the same amount
of psychological shocks. This empirical strategy allows us to estimate how war-related









Parental mortality is associated with a range of negative child outcomes. This paper
studies the effect of paternal mortality on children’s health and schooling outcomes using
the universe of veterans’ children born in Croatia, and all of the paternal deaths and
injuries resulting from the 1991-1995 Croatian-Serbian war. Using linked administrative
data, I find large negative effects of paternal death on high-school GPA, school absences,
behaviour problems, and hospitalisations. I address potentially non-random selection into
paternal death by using within-military unit differences in the extent of injury or death,
essentially assuming that the members of a military unit all had similar probabilities of
being killed or injured because they fought in the same battles. I am also able to shed
light on an important mechanism underlying the estimated effects. Surviving spouses of
those killed or injured were well compensated, so that the death of a father did not have a
negative effect on household incomes. I find that a death or injury that occurred during
the in-utero period has much larger effects than a death or injury in early childhood,
suggesting that much of the negative effect is due to maternal stress.
1I would like to thank my mother Anica Kovac (1953-2012) for all the love and continuous support she
gave me to pursue my dreams. For valuable comments and significant contributions I would like to thank
Orley Ashenfelter, Janet Currie, Henry Farber, Randy Filer, Stepan Jurajda, Jan Kmenta, Alexandre
Mas, Christopher Neilson and Jacob Shapiro. Additionally, I would like to thank the participants in the
IRS Labour Lunch session at Princeton University, and participants and my committee at the Dissertation
Proposal Workshop, CERGE-EI, Prague.
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1.1 Introduction
The importance of a father’s presence in child development has been studied in different
contexts and all show that fathers have a significant effect on children’s outcomes. The
earliest contribution of fathers is already visible during infanthood; numerous research
studies (Rowe et al. 2004; Yogman et al. 1995) show that a father’s interaction with a
child has a positive effect on cognitive development. The same effect continues during
school age on quantitative and verbal skills (Goldstein, 1982), school performance (Astone
and McLanahan; 1991), and values and attitude towards school (Alfaro et al. 2006).
While the role of the father’s involvement in child development has been extensively
studied, less research has been devoted to studying the effects of the lack of a father’s
presence, because of methodological concerns and lack of quality data.
Worldwide, an estimated 101 million children alive in 2015 had lost their father2.
This number has been on the rise due to ongoing wars, conflicts, diseases and poverty.
Many more children are deprived of a father’s presence through divorce3, incarceration4,
and even employment. Loss of a father can potentially affect a child’s outcomes through
several mechanisms. First, because they have one provider fewer, households without a
father are often poorer, according to Haveman and Wolfe (1995). Second, fathers may
contribute to child development directly through their interactions with their children by
transmission of skills and traits (Kalil et al. 2015). Third, the experience of losing a parent
may have harmful psychological effects. The Holmes and Rahe Stress Scale5 measures
stress by using a number of "life change units", and ranks death of a parent for non-adults
as the number one stressor. Clearly, all three channels of paternal mortality can severely
affect a child’s human capital accumulation, so understanding the mechanisms of effect
is necessary to create optimal responsive policies.
One of the main problems in tackling this research question is the difficulty of finding
the right methodological tool or identification strategy that would provide causal esti-
mates of loss of a father on children’s outcomes. There have been attempts to estimate
the effects of the lack of a father from households through divorce or incarceration (Am-
ato et al.1991; Murray and Farrington; 2008, Harper and McLanahan; 2004), but these
2U.S. Government "5th Annual Report to Congress on Public Law 109-95" and affirmed by UNICEF.
3In EU-28 states, the crude divorce rate increased from 0.8 per 1 000 persons in 1965 to 2.0 in 2011
(http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Marriage_and_divorce_statistics).
4According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Prisoner Statistics Program, from 2003 to
2013, the number of males in US federal and state correctional authorities has risen for around 100 000.
5The Holmes and Rahe Stress Scale is based on Holmes and Rahe (1967)
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estimates do not provide a causal effect since family-level unobservables are plausibly cor-
related with the selection into divorce or incarceration and child outcomes. Also, in these
types of research studies there are always problems accurately measuring the absence of a
father from a household (McLanahan et al. 2013). Newer research studies provide a step
forward in estimating the causal effect by using the death of a parent as a better measure
for complete absence of a parent from a household (Gertler et al. 2004), but still do not
resolve the self selection into death. Nevertheless, causal inference is possible in some
settings. For instance, Kalil et al (2015) used a within family variation in father exposure
that occurs across siblings in the event of the father’s death to estimate the effect of the
father’s presence on intergenerational transmission of educational attainment.
This study estimates the causal effect of the loss of a father on children’s outcomes
by using several novel empirical approaches. I use data from a unique setting: the 1991-
1995 Serbo-Croatian war, to compare the outcomes of children whose fathers served in
the same unit and thus were exposed to a similar risk of death. This strategy captures
unobserved elements of the endogenous part of war exposure that are correlated both
with the probability of dying and children’s long-run outcomes. Further, I use a quasi
random variation in which the state of being killed or seriously injured is exogenous to
an individual. In the second part of the paper, I focus on the prenatal and postnatal
consequences of a father’s death on children’s outcomes, and disentangle the effect of
each channel of effect. Moreover, since Croatian widows were generously compensated
with a full pension, as were families with disabled veterans, the income channel does not
operate in standard way. While we may not say that the income channel is not entirely
operative in this setting, we might say that it does not provide a negative income shock
to a fatherless family as it does in the literature. In fact, unusually, there is no difference
in average income between families that lost a father and families with fathers6. Yet, as
we will see, paternal loss is still associated with significant negative effects on children’s
educational outcomes and risky health behaviour. Thus, in the remainder of this study,
I focus on exposure to the father and the psychological shock of paternal death to both
children and their mothers as mechanisms that may explain these lingering effects.
The second part of my analysis of in-utero shocks is closely related to recent work by
Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2016) and Persson and Rosin-Slater (2016). Both studies
used the deaths of grandparents and relatives, respectively, during the in-utero period,
6Section 5.1. provides an in depth discussion about the income channel and Figures 8 and 9 provide
evidence that widows were overcompensated.
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to study the psychological shock to mothers. Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2016) used
sibling fixed effects: comparing the outcomes of two children with the same mother but
where a parent of the mother died during one of the pregnancies. Persson and Rosin-
Slater (2016) do not use sibling fixed effects because, in their case, presence of younger
siblings is endogenous due to maternal fertility responses. In this study I use military
unit fixed effects and the endogeneity of maternal fertility response does not pose a
problem. To disentangle the effect of exposure to a father from psychological effects,
another novel empirical strategy is used: quasi-random variation in timing of injury and
death. The rich dataset allows comparison of child outcomes conditional on their age
when a father’s death or injury occurred. Since the state of being seriously injured or
killed is exogenous to a soldier, this empirical strategy provides consistent estimates of
a father’s death on children’s outcomes. Furthermore, during the in-utero period, only
channel through which a child can be affected by its father’s death is solely through the
mother’s psychological shock7. By focusing only on two periods for a child: in-utero and
the first year when the father’s death/injury occurred, I differentiate the father’s time
investment from psychological shock. During the in-utero period, the father’s exposure or
time investment is zero, and during the first year it is minimal and close to zero. Across
both periods, children who lost their fathers are both deprived of father’s presence, while
the in-utero group is solely exposed to the direct psychological shock of the mother,
making it the only contributing factor to this analysis8.
This paper makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, I used a new
methodological approach with military unit fixed effects and comparison of outcomes of
children whose fathers were seriously injured or killed to estimate the causal effect of a
father’s death on children’s long-run outcomes. I find that loss of a father has a strong
and negative effect on all considered children’s outcomes. Children who lost a father
have, on average per school year, a 0.129 lower high school GPA, are 13.862 hours more
absent from school and exhibit worse school behaviour by 0.077 than children with a
father. Also, fatherless children are 1.36 times more likely to sustain an injury requiring
a hospitalisation9 than non-orphans. The second contribution of this paper is in testing
7Death of a spouse is ranked as number one stress on Holmes and Rahe Stress Scale.
8Same as the rest of the literature Black et al.(2016) and Kalil et al.(2015) I am not able to distinguish
the mechanisms of the psychological shock itself i.e. what part of the effect we contribute to stress
hormones of mothers being infused in utero and what part are changes in mother’s behaviour due to
psychological shock. For instance, after husband’s death what part of mothers starts smoking or drinking.
9We cannot contribute this to selection into hospitalisation by demographics because health services
in Croatia are free and accessible to everyone.
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the importance of a child’s age when the father’s death occurs. I find that the prevalent
effect is during the in-utero period, where I find a 30 to 50% higher magnitude of impact
for schooling outcomes and more than double the probability of an injury for fatherless
children who experienced the loss of the father during their time in the womb. Further,
prenatal exposure to paternal mortality shock affects girls more than boys for GPA,
behaviour and injuries10. Focusing only on the narrow timing of father’s death: in-utero
and up to child’s first birthday, it is possible to disentangle the psychological effect from
exposure to the father. Lastly, combining all possible permutations of sibling pairs within
a family, I am able to estimate a differential exposure to father’s time investment across
different pairs of siblings beyond the narrow in-utero - first year period. I find that as the
level of father’s disability decreases, additional year of father’s time investment becomes
significant for a child’s development. This approach opens a new venue to differentiate
and estimate the importance of a father’s presence from other channels of effects.
Overall, the unique dataset allows me to track children from in-utero up to the high
school period through schooling and hospitalisation outcomes. The study provides strong
evidence that testifies to the importance of the prenatal period. To the best of my
knowledge this is the first research study that is able to differentiate channels of effect
caused by a paternal mortality shock.
1.2 Literature Review
A growing body of research suggests that adverse conditions in early childhood may
have particularly negative long term effects. For a young child, the loss of a parent
is a traumatic event that can affect the child through multiple channels. The three
main channels of effect that have been studied in the literature are decreased financial
investment in the child, lack of parental exposure and psychological shock from the death
of the father.
The effects of family income on child development have long been an important topic
in the field, especially for policymakers. A number of studies report a positive correla-
tion of child outcomes with family resources, such as income, education, assets and time.
Research consistently documents that poverty has many detrimental effects on child de-
velopment outcomes, putting them at greater risk of poor nutrition and health problems
(Klerman, 1991), lower educational attainment (Hill and Duncan, 1987; Haveman and
10Boys show larger effect only for high school absence.
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Wolfe, 1995), lower school grades and greater likelihood of dropping out of school (Levin,
1986). Morris et al. (2003) argue that family income is more important at younger ages,
though persistent poverty is worst of all. In a recent study, Fletcher and Wolfe (2016) find
an important divergence in non-cognitive skills based on family income that accumulates
over time. Furthermore, according to Amato and Booth (2003), the effects of income on
child development outcomes are mostly due to the father’s income, since fathers continue
to contribute on average more than two thirds of the family income. Although the world-
wide gender wage gap has fallen significantly over the past 50 years men still hold the
majority of income11 which contributes to importance of this research, since the decrease
in financial investment from a father’s death is still high.
Another type of investment that is important for child development is the time in-
vestment by a father or exposure to the father. This involves transmission of any type of
skills or traits through time spent with a father. The uniqueness of this study is in the
possibility of estimating the effect of these two types of investments separately. By using
the variation in children’s age at the father’s death I estimate the significance of paternal
exposure on children’s schooling and health outcomes. The importance of parental expo-
sure to children has already been addressed by several authors, but in slightly different
contexts: (Danzer and Lavy, 2013; Heckman, Pinto and Savelyev; 2013; Gertler et al.
2013) established a positive causal effect between parental care in childhood and adult
outcomes. The main results from their studies are that more exposure to parental care
results in better adult outcomes, while (Danzer and Lavy; 2013) condition their results
on parents’ education level, which suggest that quality of exposure also matters. The
most dominant measures of the quality of a father’s exposure include the use of time
diaries, correlational studies that demonstrate the salience of a father’s presence. From a
methodological point of view, there are limitations in how measurements are made when
assessing the relationship between father involvement and child outcomes12 in these types
of studies, so I used only the length of time of exposure to a father to estimate the effect.
In a similar manner, Kalil et al (2015) exploited the systematic differences in paternal
exposure that arise across older and younger siblings when their father dies, and found
that the presence of a father substantially increases intergenerational transmission of
educational attainment.
11Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005): From the 1960s to the 1990s, raw wage differentials
worldwide have fallen substantially from around 65 to only 30%.
12Measurement issues (Pleck and Masciadrelli, 2004); sampling issues and representativeness Harper
and McLanahan (2004); social class issues Kesner and McKenry (2001)
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The last channel of effect is the short-term and long-term psychological costs of loss
of a parent. According to Trembley and Israel, (1998) the untimely death of a parent
represents a profound crisis in both acute and long-term adaptation for surviving family
members, deprives children of an enormously significant emotional exchange, and may
leave the remaining parent unprepared to fulfil his or her parental role. For instance, Har-
ris et al. (1986) observed that it was much more likely for a mother to take the additional
breadwinner role of a lost father during the post World War II period than for a father to
combine adequate care-taking with his traditional provider function. Furthermore, from
a child’s perspective, as Gertler, Levine and Ames (2004) explain, trauma may make it
difficult for children to focus on their studies temporarily or permanently. Possible per-
manent consequences are visible in the form of depression when affected children reach
adulthood, as in Nelson (1982). The novelty of this study is in using the psychological
shock from father’s death on mothers during pregnancy to separate the psychological ef-
fect from other effects. As stated in Persson and Rosin-Slater (2016), during the in utero
period, the only channel through which a child can be affected is the psychological shock
of the mother, while after birth a child is exposed to all postnatal consequences of father’s
death. Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2016) use a similar empirical strategy with mother
fixed effects and compare the outcomes of siblings where the mother experienced death
the of a parent during one of the pregnancies. Unlike these studies, I use military unit
fixed effects and compare children of fathers who served in the same unit, and thus who
had similar exposure to war, where one father died and the other was seriously injured
during military service. This strategy is a step forward in using cross-sectional varia-
tion of the probability being killed or injured to estimate the causal effect of the father’s
death on children’s outcomes. Unlike Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2016), who used the
variation in timing of a grandparent’s death and compared outcomes of children of the
same mother I compare outcomes of the children of killed, seriously injured and uninjured
soldiers. Although losing the father during peace time is not the same as losing the father
during wartime, this context does not diminish the added value of this research. On the
contrary, it allows me to use new identification strategies to estimate the causal effect of
loss of a father that prior research could not.
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1.3 The Model
The theoretical framework is laid out in the first section and followed by an econometric
specification of the model and differentiation between model specification of panel and
cross-sectional data. The last section is a theoretical discussion of possible interpretations
of the empirical results.
1.3.1 Theoretical framework
The importance of investment in early childhood on adult outcomes is based on several
theoretical models. Grossman(1972) models health as a stock variable that varies over
time and has its own investment and depreciation. Although, in his model it is referred to
as a health stock, henceforth I will refer to it as a human capital stock, since this variable
can be multidimensional, and a health stock is just one dimension. Human capital h
at the completion of childhood, depends on A, factor productivity term, investment in
human capital through the age of 5 and after the age of 513, which is denoted as I1
and I2 respectively, and weight for each period  . Depending on the levels of I1 and I2
in combination with   linearity makes this model easy to interpret. Equation (1) was
additionally augmented to a two period model by Zweifel, Breyer, and Kifmann (2009),
but this did not resolve perfect substitutability between the two investments, which makes
it a strong assumption for a model.
h = A( I1 + (1   )I2), (1)
Heckman (2007) introduced a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function as a
new approach to human capital investment technology. Now, the allocation of investment
between periods I1 and I2 will affect h differently depending on the elasticity of the
substitution, 1/(1-  ) and the weight  :




There are two important features that are not captured by (2). First, there might be
dynamic complementarities which say that investments in period t are more productive
13As in equation (1) I1 and I2 can be used to denote years rather than periods. In this study, I1 and
I2 will also represent prenatal and postnatal periods to test the timing of the shock in a more in depth
manner.
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when there is a higher capability in t-1. Second, the existence of ’self-productivity’, in
which higher levels of human capital stock in one period create higher levels in future
periods. Unlike Grossman (1972), this would matter more in cases when h is multidimen-
sional and when the cross correlations of different dimensions are positive; for instance
better health implies better cognitive abilities. The multidimensional case is of special
importance for this paper, since I track several dimensions of a child’s human capital
accumulation.
Next, I incorporate an exogenous shock that occurs during the first childhood pe-
riod. As in Currie and Almond (2011), exogenous shock µg is independent of I1 and net
investment in the first period is:
Ī1 + µg14
It is possible to extract µg while holding other inputs fixed, i.e. it is implicitly assumed
that there is no investment response to this shock in either period. This way it is possible
to explicitly derive the impact of an early life shock on adult outcomes:
 h
 µg
=  A[ (Ī1 + µg)
  + (1   )I 2 ](1  )/ (Ī1 + µg)  1, (3)
As stated in Currie and Almond (2011), most analyses of ’early origins’ focus on
estimating the reduced form effect,  h µg . Whether this effect represents a pure effect
of a shock or also represents the effect of responsive investment is an open economic
question. With their post shock investment, parents can either reinforce or compensate
for the effect. In the case of paternal mortality shock, children lose both financial and time
investment from their father, so all of the investments made come from the mother, raising
her opportunity cost. The uniqueness of this research is that the financial investment from
the father was compensated through child policies 15, but not the lack of time investment,
making this the only negative channel of effect. In terms of the compensating effect, even
if it was present from the mother in period Ī2 yields the conclusion that any estimate will
in fact underestimate the pure effect of a paternal shock.
14 Theoretically µg can be either positive or negative depending on the type of shock, while it is
assumed that
Ī1 + µg > 0
15The financial channel and its role is discussed in detail in chapter 5.1
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1.3.2 Econometric specifications
The main goal of the paper is to estimate the effect of paternal mortality on children’s
long-run schooling outcomes, while overcoming the potential problem of non-random
death of the father. In order to accomplish this, several novel approaches are used to
estimate the effects. First, the unique data allows estimation of military unit fixed effects.
This strategy captures unobserved elements of the endogenous part of the exposure to
war which can be correlated both with the probability of dying and long-run outcomes of
a child16. Second, once controlled for the uneven war exposure across military units, the
comparison is made on children of uninjured, injured and killed soldiers within the same
unit. Third, the state of being seriously disabled or dead is considered to be exogenous17
to an individual within the same unit, so it is a plausible assumption of the model to
compare the outcomes of children’ between these two groups. Fourth, the study exploits
variation in the exact timing of a father’s death or injury to estimate the effects of different
types of psychological shocks during prenatal and postnatal periods on children’s long-run
outcomes.
The main research question will be answered through two different datasets: panel
school data and cross-sectional hospitalisation data. The robust specification that will
be used throughout the paper is in equation (1) and will be used for panel data model,
while for cross-sectional data a Poisson regression model is used.
FE Model:
School Outiust = ↵0 +  1FDi +  Xit +  u + ⇣s +  t + ⌘iust (1)
School Outiust is the school outcome for child i, in school s, in year t, and father’s unit
u; FDi is a dummy variable =1 if child i lost his/her father in a war and 0 otherwise 18;
Xit is set of controls for child i in time t;  u is unit FE; ⇣s is school FE;  t is time FE;
⌘iust is the error component. School outcomes used in this regression analysis are: GPA
per year, total school absence measured in school hours and school behaviour19. The set
16For example, parent’s risk aversion
17Even for soldiers within a same unit that are exposed to same battles, there might be selection into
more risky operations within a unit. Focusing on that particular group of soldiers, still if a grenade lands
next to them, it is random who will die and who will be heavily disabled.
18The baseline group varies within the analysis. In the first part the baseline group are injured and
uninjured combined. In the second part the baseline group are only uninjured, while in part the baseline
group are uninjured fathers with dummies for every level of disability.
19The Croatian education system has the following grading scale for school grades:2 (satisfactory),
3 (good), 4 (very good) and 5(excellent); while for school behaviour there are: 1(bad), 2(good) and
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of controls used in this research are bounded by data limitations and are standard in the
literature20.
Poisson model:
Injuryit = ↵0 +  1FDi +  Xit + ⌘it (2)
Injuryit is a hospitalisation due to an injury for child i, in time t; FDi is a dummy
variable=1 if child i lost his/her father in a war and 0 otherwise; Xit is set of controls for
a child i in time t; ⌘iust is the error component.
Dyadic model:
 School Outijf = ↵0 +  1 Time exposureijf + ⌘ijf (3)
 School Outijf is the difference in school outcomes for sibling pair ij, in family f, where
  is the difference in outcomes between older minus younger sibling;  Time exposureijf
is the difference in time spent with a father for a pair of sibling ij, in family f; ⌘ijf is
the error component. This regression is run by deceases status and all disability levels of
fathers.
For the dyadic model I created all possible permutations of siblings within each family
to disentangle the differential sibling exposure to father’s time investment.
1.3.3 Prenatal and postnatal analysis
This part of the empirical strategy improves on Persson and Rosin-Slatter (2016), in
which they compared children who experienced the death of a family relative during the
prenatal period, with those who experienced the death in the postnatal period. Using the
quasi-random variation of being killed or being seriously injured within the same unit it is
possible to test the effects of different psychological shocks21 on children during prenatal
and postnatal periods. Children who were exposed to a psychological shock from their
3(exemplary).
20Controls used are standard in the literature: see Currie and Almond (2011), Black et al. (2016),
Kalil et al, (2015), Persson and Rossin-Slater, (2016).
21According to the Holmes and Rahe stress test, the death of a spouse is ranked the number 1 life
stressor, while health issues of a close family member is ranked 11th, so the baseline group has some
psychological shock but of a much lower magnitude. It only matters that the difference in magnitudes is
estimated consistently.
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mother during the prenatal period can only be affected through the uterine environment,
while the rest of children have been exposed to all postnatal consequences of the father’s
death. The regression used in the estimation is the same as the first two specifications,
but confined only to children of killed and injured soldiers.
The father’s death can influence a child through three channels of effect: financial
investment22, time investment and psychological shock. By using a particular identifi-
cation strategy it is possible to disentangle the effects. Using the random variation in
the timing of death and injury of a father, I compare children of killed with those of
seriously disabled soldiers while controlling for war exposure within the same unit. For
the population as a whole this will give a joint estimate of the time investment of a father
and a psychological shock. Focusing on children who experienced the paternal mortality
shock during in-utero and first year period I am able to separate the two. The time
investment of a father with a child during prenatal period is zero and for the first year is
also minuscule, but non-zero. Next, during the in-utero period a child receives a direct
effect from a psychological shock through the uterine environment and high cortisol levels
of the mother23 making it the only channel of effect in this comparison.
The theoretical model presented in Section 3.1. implicitly assumes no investment
responses by mothers to paternal mortality shock in either period, which is a strong
assumption. The responsive investment of mothers is unobserved in the data, so it is not
possible to check the magnitude of investment or whether it is responsive or compensatory.
My theoretical addition will build up on pioneering work of Currie and Almond (2011) in
order to utilise the empirical strategy in this type of a setting. I will relax the assumption
of no responsive investment and elaborate on potential mechanisms. I will consider several
cases as a theoretical application of Currie and Almond (2011) model to my particular
setting where the ’no compensating investments’ assumption is relaxed.
Case 1
Responsive investment of mothers after paternal mortality shock is non-zero.
If the responsive investment of mothers is non-zero then the reduced form estimate of
the effect  h µg is a joint estimate of a shock and responsive investment. After the loss of
the father, mothers can either maintain the same level of investment as before or invest
22The uniqueness of this research shows that this channel remained intact due to military pension
payments.
23Loss of a close family members induces greater levels of self-reported grief and produces stronger
cortisol responses (see, e.g.: Segal and Bouchard, 1993; O’Connor et al., 2012).
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more to try to compensate. In the first case, since investment is the same we would get
the pure estimate of paternal mortality shock. In the second case, since mothers invest
more, the pure effect of the paternal mortality shock is much larger i.e. true effect of my
estimates is underestimated.
Case 2
Mothers are not gender discriminatory in terms of compensating investment
Several studies suggest that both shocks and interventions can have different long-term
effects on males and females. One possibility is that gender effect differences are biologi-
cal24. For example, boys may be less robust than girls, so that the same health shock can
affect boys and girls differently (e.g., see Kraemer (2000), Almond and Mazumder (2008)).
Alternatively, gender differences may reflect differential parental or societal responses to
shocks inspired by son preferences or by beliefs about biological gender differences. Either
way, as in previous studies, I am not able to distinguish whether the gender differences in
reaction to shocks arise from different biological factors or different post shock differential
treatment by the child’s environment. Nevertheless, I can elaborate on possibilities that
might be driving the results. If mothers are not gender discriminatory in terms of post
shock investment the results shown in this paper about gender differences give evidence of
biological differences in reaction to a paternal mortality shock. Otherwise, the differences
lie in different interventions with respect to gender.
Case 3
Mothers are not discriminatory in terms of timing of the shock
In the last decade, economists have produced a great deal of research in support of the
"in-utero" hypothesis. For instance, Currie and Cole (1993) compare siblings in families
in which the mother received welfare while one child was in utero, but not while the other
child was in utero, and find no difference in the birth weight of the siblings. In this paper,
I use the timing of the death of the father to estimate the effect of psychological shock
during the in-utero period. Comparing children who lost their father while in utero with
24Wizemann and Pardue (2001) find that basic genetic and physiological differences, in combination
with environmental factors, result in behavioural and cognitive differences between males and females.
They find that hormones play a role in behavioural and cognitive sex differences but are not solely
responsible for those differences. Akbulut and Yuksel (2017) find that girls suffer the most from war
exposure.
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those who were up to their one year of age at the time of the loss, it is possible to isolate
the mechanisms. Looking at that narrow time window, the assumption is that mothers do
not discriminate in terms of responsive investment conditional on timing of the paternal
mortality shock. For example, if mothers that experienced a paternal mortality shock
during the child’s first year compensate more with investments, the difference would not
be because of the differential impact of the psychological shock from the father’s death
but rather the difference in investment. As in past research, using the random timing of
death and injury of a father remedies any potential unobserved elements.
1.4 Data
The first section provides information about the historical setting of the study. The
second sections describes datasets and variables used in this research.
1.4.1 Historical setting
Serbo - Croatian war (1991-1996)
The Croatian War for Independence, also known as Serbo-Croatian war, was fought
from 1991 to 1995 on the whole territory of Croatia (Figure 3). During the war, approx-
imately 20 000 civilians and soldiers were killed, and estimates indicate around 50 000
were injured. Due to the lack of a civilian casualty registry, this study will focus only on
combatants i.e. military personnel. This sub-selection can raise certain questions about
the generalisability of this study, but a series of robustness checks are made, including a
comparison of the children of volunteers and draftees, to try to make the inference more
generalisable25.
1.4.2 Datasets
The data used in this research is combined administrative data from several official gov-
ernment sources in Croatia: the Ministry of Veterans, the Ministry of Health, the Depart-
ment of Defence, the Statistical Office and the Ministry of Science, Sports and Education.
25As Angrist and Krueger (1992), I use set of draftees as representative sample of the Croatian popu-
lation as a whole. Whether the draft was really random it is beyond the scope of this paper, but a more
detailed analysis of the draft procedure appears in Jurajda and Kovac(2016).
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Military data
Military data used in this research includes the universe of Croatian military veterans
from the Serbo-Croatian war. It is an administrative data set from the Ministry of
Veterans that contains family and war related variables about every soldier. Not all of
observations is used in the analysis. The analysis sample is limited to whose who: i)
have children; ii) their children were in the school data. There is no sample selection
problem in the selection because the analysis is still on the universe of children, but on
the youngest group26. The age range of children in high school is from 14 to 19 years
old, but the long term effect might be from minimum of 12 years to 20 years after the
incidence depending when the death happened. War related variables are available for
every soldier: days in the military, days in combatant and non-combatant sectors, unit,
rank 27, date and place of incidence (death or injury), type of death or injury. Family
level data that is considered for fathers and children includes: gender, date and place
of birth. Other family level variables include: number, age and gender of all children in
the family, family composition, father’s age and income from military pensions28. In the
robustness checks sections I also utilise: date of entry and exit from the army, and type
of exit.
School data
School data comes from a registry of all elementary and high school students in Croatia
from 2008 to 2014. It is an administrative data from the Ministry of Science, Sports
and Education. Veterans’ children were matched in this dataset through social security
numbers. This research uses the universe of soldier’s children who were in the data in any
year of the study of the observed period. The school data includes: gender, nationality,
school, type of school, type of program, class, grades, teachers, absence in hours per
school year, within and outside school activities and school behaviour.
The two datasets combined allow a rich selection of controls: father’s age at child’s
26The war was from 1991 to 1995 and the school data starts from 2008, so I still analyse all the children,
but the focus is on the lower tail of the distribution.
27Rank data is available for deceased soldiers.
28By the Law for Veterans up to 2012 widows were not able to re-marry if they wanted to keep the
pension from their deceased husband. Even if they did live with some in their household i.e. there was
a substitute father figure, it would only imply that the negative effects are underestimated i.e. much
larger.
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birth, father age at child’s birth squared, the number and gender of children29, family
income per capita, year of birth of a child, year of birth of a child and gender interaction,
birth order, whether the child was last born and gender of a child.
Hospitalisation data
Hospitalisation data is a registry of all hospitalisations of soldiers’ children from 2006
to 2015. It contains the date, duration and type of hospitalisation30. Military data
and school data combined make an unbalanced panel, while hospitalisation and military
datasets form a cross-sectional count data.
Outcome variables
Outcome variables used are divided into two main groups: education and health out-
comes. I observe yearly grades per subject for each child in the registry for high school
and calculate yearly average GPA. Additionally I observe yearly high school absence and
high school behaviour grade. These three measures are the main education outcome that
I use in my analysis. Next, in accordance with WHO International Statistical Classifica-
tion of Diseases and Related Health Problems I focus on outcomes connected with risky
behaviour such as "injury, poisoning and certain other consequences of external causes"
classified as S00 to T98. To be able to capture both the intensive and the extensive
margin I focus on probability of being injured and number of injuries.
29Even though children who finished the school before 2008 are out of the school analysis, nevertheless
they are in the data and controlled for through number of children in a family.
30In accordance with the World Health Organisation:International Statistical Classification of Diseases
and Related Health Problems 10th Revision.
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1.5 Results
The results section is divided into several parts. The first section analyses the importance
of family income as a channel of effect. The second section provides insights on balancing
tests. The third section investigates the effects of paternal mortality on: high school
GPA, high school behaviour, high school absence and hospitalisations. The fourth part is
focused on series of robustness checks. The fifth part provides evidence of the importance
of timing of paternal mortality. The last two parts test the effect of particular level
of father’s disability and differential sibling exposure to paternal time investment on
children’s outcomes.
1.5.1 Family income as a channel of effect
Remediation programs and policies serve to attenuate the initial damage of the shock of a
father’s death and to dampen further damage in the later stages of a child’s life. According
to Currie and Almond (2011) the success of remediation policies depends on the amount
of initial damage from the shock, a child’s factor productivity, share of investment in
the period of the shock and elasticity of substitution of investment between the first
and second period. Although, this research improves on past studies by controlling for
financial income of families, it is imperative to elaborate on this channel as past research
has highlighted its importance.
In addition to psychological shock, the father’s death also affects a child also through
lessening time and financial investment. A secondary effect is that the lack of a father
raises the mother’s opportunity cost, which in return, can influence a mother to spend
less time with a child. Croatian veterans’ families were entitled to a military pension31
depending on the degree of the disability of the father and deceased status for affected
families. The uniqueness of this context is that the cash transfers to veterans’ families
addressed budgetary problems without necessarily changing the production technology,
so one test is whether family income differed between deceased and non-deceased soldiers’
families. Deceased soldiers’ families sole income was the military pension that widows
were receiving, while for non-deceased soldiers’ families, fathers received military pensions
and mothers worked on the labour market. I only do not observe mothers’ income for
31By the Law of Rights of the Croatian military veterans and their families; paragraph 26, beneficiaries
of military pensions were forbidden to receive any other income while receiving military pensions. Non
compliance would mean losing the military pension.
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disabled families, while I observe the entire family’s income for deceased soldier’s families
i.e. military pensions widows were receiving. That should not pose a significant problem
since the military pensions received by disabled soldiers were high and would make a
large share of family’s income. Secondly, I observe the disability level of each soldier so
the robust coefficients can be estimates as shown in Tables 13 and 14.
Figures 8 and 9 show that both total and per capita pension income of deceased
soldiers’ families were more than double that of their non-deceased counterparts. The
blue line shows an average per capita income for a Croatian family with both parents
working in the observed period32, while the red line shows double that amount. It is
important to highlight two things. First, widows were, on average, compensated more
than double when compared to families of disabled soldiers. Second, both disabled and
deceased soldiers’ families were receiving solely from pensions more than what an average
Croatian family would earn on the job market. The same pattern is visible in Figure 1
if we observe military pensions by disability levels. This leads to a unique setting, in
which, unlike Kalil et al. (2015), paternal mortality did not lead to a secondary effect of
changing the mother’s post mortem labor market choices to compensate for the lessening
of financial means, but rather the only effect is in the lack of a father’s time investment.
As stated in Currie and Almond (2011) it is difficult to find examples of remediation
policies that increase incomes without potentially having a direct effect on outcomes33,
so reduced form estimates would be joint estimates of paternal mortality shock and
remediation income transfers34. Since they work in opposite directions, estimates of the
paternal mortality shock in this empirical strategy are potentially underestimated35.
1.5.2 Balancing tests
Tables 1 to 4 present the results when I run balancing tests to verify that there are no
observable differences in the characteristics of children and their families, who experience
the death or the disability of their father. I compare these characteristics before the
war and not at time of death/injury36 for two reasons. The Serbo-Croatian war started
32Data from Statistical Office of Croatia.
33Fletcher and Wolfe (2016); Amato and Booth (1997) find a positive effect of income on children
outcomes.
34According to the theory and empirical evidence listed in McLanahan et al. (2013) they work in
opposite directions. Paternal mortality shock produces negative effects, while income produces positive
effects on children’s outcomes.
35Nevertheless in the section 5.3. family income is included in series of robustness checks.
36This only affects time variant variables like age.
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in spring of 1991 and the available census data is from 1991, making it the ideal pre-
treatment comparison. The second reason is that making a comparison from the time of
death/injury would exclude the uninjured group from the analysis.
The first part of the analysis compares family level characteristics across two com-
parisons: Tables 1-2 and Appendix Table 1. Appendix Table 1 presents statistically
significant differences between fatherless families and families that have a father, either
injured or non-injured. Although the differences are statistically significant, they are
rather small in magnitude. For the first part of the analysis, I will compare fatherless
families and families that have a father, either injured or non-injured. The reason to focus
on this type of a comparison is the weighting between very precise comparison groups and
interpretation. As is visible in the rest of this section, higher levels of disabilities are sta-
tistically no different from the fatherless group. There is a tradeoff between interpretation
and having the right comparison group for the killed fathers in the war. Interpretation
wise they might have a non-standard interpretation of being fatherless versus having a
disabled father. Both research questions are important, so I will use higher level disabili-
ties and uninjured interchangeably as a baseline group in my econometric specifications.
Table 1 shows that families of fathers with higher level disabilities are statistically no
different from the fatherless families. The cutoff of significance varies from one family
characteristic to another, but in general they all support the use of high level disability
groups as a statistically valid comparison to fatherless families.
The second part of the analysis compares village/city level characteristics across the
same comparisons. I do not observe pretreatment family income, but I observe year and
place of birth of all children, for all families. Based on that I infer place of residence
before the war to the lowest level of zip code. From this analysis it is possible to gain
some insights into what type of neighbourhoods families were living in. For family level
characteristics, Appendix Table 2 presents statistical differences across fatherless families
and families that have a father, either injured or non-injured. Tables 3 and 4 reports
that families whose fathers sustained higher level disabilities families are statistically no
different from fatherless families.
1.5.3 Effects of paternal mortality on long-run outcomes
Tables 5 - 8 present the results of the effect of a father’s death on children’s high school
GPA, absence, behaviour and hospitalisations. Estimates show significant and negative
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effects of a father’s death on all forth-mentioned children’s long-run outcomes. Children
who have lost a father have, on average, per school year, a 0.129 lower high school GPA,
are 13.862 hours more absent from school and have worse school behaviour by 0.077. Also,
fatherless children are 1.36 times more likely to incur an injury requiring hospitalisation
than children with a father. On the intensive margin, fatherless children experience 0.015
higher average number of injuries. As seen in tables 5 - 8, the results are very robust
to inclusion of different sets of controls. Remarkably, I find no influence of the father’s
death on their daughters’ GPA, while there is significant influence on sons. The greatest
difference is in absence from high school, where boys have, on average, 26.905 absent hours
during a school year, while girls have 21.905. These findings agree with past research into
disruptive behaviour and gender differences in single-mother families by Bertrand and
Pan (2013). They find that boys do especially poorly in broken families. According to
them, differences in endowments explain a small part of boys’ non-cognitive deficit in
single-mother families. This raises an important question, which has not been answered
in past research, whether the gender differences in reaction to early childhood shocks are
biological, that boys react differently to the same types of shocks or that the outcomes
are related to responsive investment, meaning that parents are gender discriminatory
when it comes to post shock investment. In section 3.3. I relax the assumption of no
responsive investment and provide a discussion on possible mechanisms. Another reason
boys might be more affected by their father’s death lies in the transmission process itself.
There might be a gender homophily in the transmission process, where a parent of the
same gender as the child is more efficient in transmitting the skills. One study that goes
along the line of the transmission process of school attainment is Kalil et al. (2015).
They used within family variation in father exposure that occurs across siblings in the
event of a father’s death and find that longer paternal exposure amplifies the father-child
association with boys being affected more.
1.5.4 Robustness checks
This section presents results that test the robustness of the main findings across children
outcomes divided into school outcomes and hospitalisations.
Type of high schools
For school outcomes, my main econometric specification in equation (1) examined the
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effects over the set of all high schools that children were attending. My data allows me to
test over different types of high schools and even programs. I wanted to investigate how
fatherless children cope in more competitive environments, so I focused my analysis on
gymnasiums. Appendix Table 4 to 6 column 8 show the differences across gymnasiums
and the results are slightly different. Fatherless children in gymnasiums have a 0.14 lower
GPA per year than children with fathers, which is not statistically different from 0.129
for all schools. High school absence is still positive and significant at 9.276, but a bit
lower than the estimate for whole sample of schools, which should be expected since we
are testing the "best" schools. One result that surprises is that fatherless children in
gymnasiums have worse behaviour scores relative to the set of all schools. Nevertheless,
results once more show that the negative effect of the loss of a father across all schooling
outcomes remains present, no matter the quality or type of high schools, and the differ-
ences between school types are negligible. In my main analysis I also used school FE to
exclude any unobserved variable on the school level. Since school choice is to some extent
endogenous use of school FE might be over-constraining. Therefore, I ran separate set of
regressions that did not include school FE and as it is visible in Appendix Tables 4 - 6,
column 13 the results are not statistically different from the main specification.
Family income
Family income is one of three channels through which a child may be influenced by a
paternal mortality shock. As already discussed in Section 5.1. families without a father
were compensated, so family income as a channel is not dominant, since there is little
variation within the population of fatherless families37 due to military pensions. It is
visible in Appendix Tables 4 to 6, column 9 that inclusion of family income as a control
variable only slightly changes the magnitude of the coefficient, but in the same direction.
All three outcomes are lower in magnitude once family income is controlled for, but the
outcomes are not statistically different.
Draftee and volunteer fathers
The Serbo-Croatian war lasted from spring of 1991 to the end of 1995. During that
period, the army was composed of volunteers and draftees (Fig 4 and 5). Volunteers self-
37The lower bound for family income of fatherless families was still 50 percent higher than that of the
average 4 member family, where both parents worked.
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selected into the army, while draftees were selected through a draft procedure38.These
two ways of entering the army potentially signal some fathers’ unobserved characteristics
that might be driving the results. For this reason I ran two separate regressions: one
for volunteer and one for draftee fathers. Fatherless children of volunteers have a 0.126
lower GPA than children of volunteers with living fathers, while fatherless children of
draftee fathers have a 0.108 lower GPA than children of draftees with fathers. Appendix
Table 5 shows that fatherless children of draftees and volunteers have 13.629 and 15.422
respectively, more hours absent than the children with fathers. Lastly, in Appendix
Table 6 shows that once again the children of deceased draftees have a less negative effect
of 0.078 than those of deceased volunteers 0.083 in terms of school behaviour. For all
three school outcomes children of volunteers who died are relatively more affected by their
father’s death than draftee’s children, but if we look at the confidence intervals there is no
significant difference in the coefficient values. Furthermore, analysis of draftee’s children
is especially important since the quasi-random draft procedure allows generalisation of
their results on the entire population of Croatia.
War exposure and timing of entry to the army
According to Fig 6 and 7 timing of entry into the army mattered, since it might
have been that by luck a soldier served during a peaceful time, or with bad luck, during
severe fighting. It is visible that there were two spikes in terms of high fighting exposure
during late 1991 and in summer 1995, when numerous soldiers died and were injured.
For that reason, it is possible that timing of the entry into the army is correlated with
some soldier’s characteristics and which might influence the estimates. For instance, if
more risk prone men were selected during severe fighting, it might have happened that
these men would be more likely to be injured or killed. Although, my empirical strategy
resolves this issue, it is useful to test whether some groups are overrepresented in the
sample of injured and dead and how this influences the results. For this reason, I tested
only men present in the army during high war exposure, the times of spikes in graphs 6
and 7. The results show no statistical difference in coefficient values between the main
results and the sample of children whose fathers were in the army during high exposure.
GPA estimates in Appendix Table 4 show a negative effect of 0.135 of the loss of the
38Detailed analysis on the structure of the Croatian army, volunteering and draft procedure appears
in Jurajda and Kovac (2016).
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father on a child. Fatherless children have 14.704 higher school absence per year and
0.049 worse school behaviour. This suggestive evidence shows that the timing of entry
into army did not matter for my results, i.e., that the subpopulation of soldiers that were
injured or died during high war exposure is no different from the entire population.
Hospitalisations and injuries
Hospitalisations are included in a separate analysis of robustness checks, because of
the different setting of outcome variables of children, and because the data is not in a
panel setting as are school outcomes. Childhood injuries are a common proxy of risky
behaviour in the literature, but they can be difficult to interpret. For instance, more
active children can simply have more injuries, which may not a bad signal, but can be
due to behavioural issues. My rich data allows me to test this research question by
controlling for school activities. I excluded children enrolled in any formal high school
activity and focused solely on children with no activities. Fatherless children not enrolled
in any school activity have still 1.314 times higher probability of being injured than non-
orphan children which is not statistically different from 1.36 for the entire population.
Evidence shows that being injured is not determined by whether a child is engaged in
any school activities, which indicates that children without a father are more prone to
injuries beyond the scope of their everyday activities. Inclusion of family income as a
control variable reduces the estimates slightly, but fatherless children are still 1.281 more
likely to be injured than children with fathers. Once more income channel reduces the
estimates, but the estimates remain not statistically different from our main specification.
The last three regression outputs test for war related circumstance that might influenced
fathers. Timing of entry into the army, draftee and volunteer statuses of fathers had
insignificant effects on children’s injuries.
Military unit analysis
As a last robustness check I focused on military unit analysis, since the use of military
unit FE as an important factor of my empirical strategy. I calculated the average number
number of soldiers across all military units and constrained my set of regressions on small
sized units. The underlying assumption is that it should not matter for the state of
being killed and highly disabled comparison, since it is exogenous to individuals, but
it might have an effect on the baseline group. For instance, soldiers in smaller units
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might have a greater interpersonal cohesion which would make the psychological shock
of experiencing war carnage bigger or smaller shock for surviving/disabled soldiers than
in the bigger units39. Hence the baseline comparison of soldiers with different levels of
disability across different unit size could have a differential treatment on children. By
focusing my analysis on small units, less than 300 soldiers, Appendix Tables 4-6 column
14 I find no statistically difference with comparing it with the main specification across
all observed outcomes.
1.5.5 Prenatal and postnatal exposure to paternal mortality shock
This section provides an in-depth analysis of channels through which children might have
been affected by a father’s death. The income channel has been discussed in the previous
two sections, and this section discusses time investment of the father and psychological
shock. To disentangle the two effects, I extended my main econometric specification and
included the timing of the father’s death or injury. Balancing tests provide evidence that
once war exposure is controlled for, through comparison of fathers that served in the
same unit, that the state of being killed or severely injured is exogenous to an individual
during combat, so estimates should be consistent and unbiased. Additionally, using the
time variation in a child’s exposure to the father, it is possible to estimate its effect. The
more time a child spent with his/her father, the more the child would benefit. On the
other hand, older children may have stronger emotional attachments to the father, which
could cause a greater emotional trauma when the father is injured or killed. Obviously
these two effects work in opposing directions and the estimates are an interaction of both
effects. To remedy this identification problem, I used a very narrow window of in-utero
and first year exposure to paternal mortality shock. During the in-utero period, a child
can only be affected directly through the psychological shock of the mother, while one
year old children are affected through the first year time investment from the father40.
Time investment within the first year is the shortest amount a child could receive from
the father, but it is still non-zero, so as a robustness check I used a variation in duration
in the army before the death for fathers dying within a child’s first year to pin down
the time investment to zero. This way comparing in-utero with first year estimates gives
39In fact, Costa and Khan (2010) find the opposite that men who served during the US Civil war in
more cohesive units were less affected by unit level exposure to carnage.
40During the first year there is a direct effect through a high cortisol levels of the mother while in-
utero. Richardson et al.(2015) show that spousal loss has a significant effect on high cortisol levels of
the bereaved spouses.
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us roughly the estimate of a psychological shock. Also, one should keep in mind the set
of cases made in section 3.3. to neglect the influence of responsive investment, so I will
implicitly follow the theoretical model of Currie and Almond (2011) in this respect.
Results show that the timing of paternal death and length of exposure to the father
have significant effects only during the in-utero period. For high school GPA, behaviour
and injuries, the in-utero period is also the only significant period, while for high school
absence, additionally the first and second year of life are significant. Narrowing down
the analysis to only the in-utero period and right after birth, and if assumptions of non
discriminatory responsive investment and control for soldiers absent in the child’s first
year hold, I estimate the effect of in-utero psychological shocks on children’ outcomes.
The GPA coefficient for children whose fathers died when they were in-utero is 0.173 lower
for fatherless children, which is around 40% higher magnitude than for the population
as a whole in the main specification. High school behaviour of children whose father
died when they were in the in-utero period is 0.111 lower for fatherless children and that
is higher order of magnitude than negative 0.077 of the entire population. The biggest
scale effect is on the probability of being injured, in which children experiencing paternal
mortality shock during the in-utero period are 3.086 more likely to be injured than the
children of injured fathers, which is around a 2.5 times stronger effect than in the entire
population. For high school absences, fatherless children have 16.292 more absences,
which is almost on par with the entire population.These results show the importance of
the in-utero period and the effect of psychological shock from a father’s death on later
outcomes. They give evidence of the effect of another channel beyond the absence of the
father.
Next to the in-utero period, the age group of four years of age and older provides,
although insignificant, nevertheless interesting results. Tables 9 to 12 for all children’s
outcomes suggest two to three times stronger magnitudes for high school absences and
school behaviour, than the in-utero period, and for GPA and injuries they are of the same
magnitude. These results give suggestive evidence that for older children there is a cutoff
age of a child at father’s death, when emotional attachment to a father plays a significant
role and can be an evidence of a trauma mechanism.
In-utero shocks by gender
From the previous section it is visible that exposure to psychological shocks during
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the in-utero period has a strong and negative effect on children’s outcomes in later life.
This section explores whether boys and girls react differently. An important variable
that is unobserved in this research is the responsive investment of mothers’ after the
death of a father. First, it is not known whether mothers in any way decrease or increase
investment conditional on child’s gender after the death of a father. Second, I consider
whether mothers invest more in children exposed to a paternal mortality shock during
the prenatal or postnatal period. The second assumption should not be problematic
since I am comparing children experiencing a prenatal shock across gender, but the first
assumption matters since I consider the psychological effects by gender.
Appendix Table 3 shows that for GPA, school behaviour and injuries, girls are affected
more than boys. Girls who experienced paternal shock while in utero have 0.337 lower
GPA, 0.270 worse behaviour and 2.717 higher probability of being injured than girls of
injured fathers. School absence is the only outcome in which boys feel a stronger effect
in magnitude than girls i.e. 25.768 more absent than boys of injured fathers.
1.5.6 Father’s disability level and children’s outcomes
Lack of a father’s presence has a significant and negative effect on all estimated children’s
outcomes. Additionally, I observe that the in-utero period is highly significant, which
testifies to the importance of that period and the impact of psychological shock. Since
the baseline group so far was an aggregate across all disability levels, now I will look at the
effect of each particular level of disability on children’s long-run outcomes to test whether
it will change the estimated effect of father’s death. Figure 2 graphically portrays the
result for high school absence and it is visible that there is a cascading effect of increase
of father’s disability level on a child’s high school absence. Nevertheless, the effect of the
father’s death is still the strongest. Same pattern is observed for high school GPA and
school behaviour in Appendix Figure 1 and Figure 2. Table 13 shows in some cases the
significance of 100 % disabled fathers41 42 . This testifies to the difficulties of growing up
with a seriously disabled father and I will provide additional evidence in the next section.
41The model in Table 13 uses dummy variables for the father’s level of disability up to 20 %, with
uninjured as baseline group. For exposition purposes these estimates are omitted but available upon
request.
42The difference between two categories of 100 % disabled fathers is that category I had mothers taking
care of their husbands and being paid for it by the Ministry while the category II mothers were working
on the labor market.
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High school GPA in Table 13 remains about the same as the main specification with
0.132 negative effect. The same holds true for high school absences with 13.525 higher
absence for fatherless children, 0.066 worse high school behaviour and 1.437 times higher
probability of sustaining an injury that ends in hospitalisation than children with fathers.
1.5.7 Differential sibling exposure to father’s time investment
Specifics of the initial identification strategy and available data do not allow the use of
family level fixed effects in a standard way, since the father is not present. Still, to utilise
the information hidden on a family level, I created a permutations of all possible sibling
pairs within each family and use the random timing of deaths/injuries across families
to test the effect of father’s time investment on education outcomes43. The independent
variable is the difference in years spent with a father between an older and a younger
sibling, where I use the fact that different fathers were dying and getting injured at
different ages of sibling pairs across families. The dependent variable is the difference in
education outcomes between an older and a younger sibling. The interpretation of the
coefficient from this type of an analysis is the effect of marginal increase of one more
year of time investment for an older sibling and the effect it has on the difference in
educational outcomes. I ran separate regressions by killed status and levels of disability
to test the heterogeneous treatment effect across different groups of fathers. Table 14
shows that for sibling pairs without a father and higher levels of disabilities there is an
insignificant effect of time investment of a father on education outcomes. As the level of
disability of a father decreases the effect of one more year spent with a father becomes
more significant. It is not possible to state whether this is the real effect of children
benefiting more through time spent with healthier father or it is due to lower levels of
observations for higher level of disabilities. Nevertheless, we can focus on the magnitude
and the direction of the effects. Although insignificant, sibling pairs without a father have
the biggest magnitude across all three education outcomes, which intuitively is correct
because it is a complete absence of a father. Contrary to that, disabled soldiers are still
investing their time into their kids, but the transmission process can be less efficient as
we increase the disability level. For the lower levels of disabilities there is no statistical
difference in the effects what implies that the transmission process is not affected. The
directions of the majority coefficients for GPA are positive, meaning that the increase
43Hospitalisation is a binary variable and therefore out of the scope of this analysis.
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in one more year of time investment for an older sibling has a positive effect on older
sibling’s GPA. For high school absence and behaviour a one more year of time investment
from a father has the opposite effect, high school absence increases while high school
behaviour decreases i.e. becomes worse.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper analyses the effects of the father’s death on children’s long-run outcomes
and exploits several novel identification strategies to estimate separate channels through
which the father’s death may have influenced a child. Due to the relatively small number
of natural death incidences in everyday life, most of the literature is confined to using
large administrative datasets that span over 30 years and more. This research uses a
narrower timeline by exploiting the paternal mortality shocks that occurred during the
Croatian-Serbian war, a deadly conflict that was the first war on European soil after the
World War II. The use of this type of data makes a new methodological approach, and
thus improves on past research. Comparing children of soldiers, who served in the same
unit across the two categories: killed or seriously injured, I control for any unobserved
variable that is potentially correlated with the father’s probability of dying and long-run
outcomes of the child. Furthermore, quasi random variation in state of being killed or
seriously injured is considered to be exogenous to an individual.
I find negative effects of father’s death on all long-run outcomes of children: hospi-
talisations for injuries, high school GPA, high school absenteeism and behaviour. In the
second part of my study, I use the age of a child at the time of the father’s death to
estimate the importance of length of exposure to the father. I find that only the in-utero
period provides consistently significant results across all observed children’s outcomes.
Remarkably, during the in-utero period, girls are affected more by the father’s death
than boys. It is not possible to say with certainty whether these gender differences are
in fact biological or due to differences in family’s responsive investment by gender af-
ter paternal mortality shock, but I elaborate on different cases based on the theoretical
model of Currie and Almond (2011) that I am using. Also, by focusing solely on children
who experienced their father’s death during their first year of life or the in-utero period
it is possible to estimate the effect of psychological shock of the mother on children’s
outcomes. Empirical evidence shows that the psychological shock of the spouse’s death
during pregnancy has a significant and negative effect on all children’s outcomes. Fur-
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ther, the group of children, at the age of four and more at the time of the father’s death,
exhibits, although insignificant, but the strongest magnitude estimates for all children’s
outcomes. This group has already attained a significant amount of time investment from
their fathers, so it is unclear which channel has the overwhelming effect. One of the
possible explanations might be that, as children are older, they become more emotionally
attached to their fathers, so the psychological shock is of a greater scale than the father’s
time investment, making these results evidence of a trauma mechanism.
As shown in this study, the importance of a particular channel through which a
father’s death influences a child varies conditional on the age of the child. While my
findings may not generalise to all other possible types of fathers’ absenteeism like divorce
or incarceration, I believe that this study sheds some light on mechanisms through which
a child may be influenced by father’s absence. It also highlights the importance of the
child’s age at the time of the father’s death and which channel/s matter the most.
Finally, surviving spouses of those killed or injured in the Croatian war were well
compensated, so that the death of a father did not have a negative effect on household
incomes. Despite the large financial compensations to fatherless families, I still find strong
negative effects on all children’s outcomes. This provides evidence that there is a finite
level of substitutability between financial investment and time investment of a father.
Therefore, future policies should be more focused on compensating the time investment
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Figure 1.1: Military pensions by mortality and disability status
Note: The blue line shows an average 4 member family per capita income. The red line shows double.
Figure 1.2: School absence by mortality and disability status
Note: Data is standardised and in units of standard deviations
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Figure 1.3: Geographical map of the Serbo-Croatian war
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Figure 1.4: Entry into Croatian Army by type of soldiers
Figure 1.5: Number of soldiers in Croatian Army by type of soldiers
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Figure 1.6: Monthly probabilities of dying during the war by type of soldiers
*Note: Probabilities are calculated based on the set of units within the analysis
Figure 1.7: Monthly probabilities of injury during the war by type of soldiers
*Note: Probabilities are calculated based on the set of units within the analysis
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Figure 1.8: Yearly amounts of total military pensions
Figure 1.9: Yearly amounts of per capita military pensions
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Tables
Table 1.1: Means by Disability Levels
Family level variables before the war
Killed 100% II 100% I 90% 80% 70% 60%
Number of kids 1.196 1.253 1.214 1.275 1.229 1.370 1.261
(0.013) (0.058) (0.055) (0.059) (0.034) (0.033) (0.023)
Share of male kids 0.514 0.594 0.464 0.568 0.439 0.537 0.517
(0.015) (0.052) (0.062) (0.060) (0.038) (0.027) (0.023)
Average age of kids 1.685 1.941 1.693 2.029 1.642 1.595 1.859
(0.046) (0.243) (0.210) (0.309) (0.134) (0.107) (0.086)
Father’s age 33.705 34.118 35.741 33.868 34.374 34.126 33.756
(0.158) (0.424) (0.928) (0.467) (0.294) (0.218) (0.189)
Mother’s age 25.050 23.750 18.25 25.428 20.857 19.521 23.947
(0.974) (2.393) (1.729) (2.486) (2.382) (1.110) (1.100)
Observations 989 150 95 134 293 502 817
*Note: Groups highlighted red are statistically different from the "Killed" group. Mother’s age is the only variable based on the
information from a sample. Number of observations vary across different characteristics due to random missing observations
(less than 2% on average)
Table 1.2: Means by Disability Levels
Family level variables before the war
50% 40% 30% 20% Uninjured
Number of kids 1.255 1.209 1.243 1.264 1.246
(0.027) (0.039) (0.040) (0.027) (0.039)
Share of male kids 0.521 0.496 0.497 0.496 0.498
(0.017) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014)
Average age of kids 1.723 1.925 1.831 1.899 1.839
(0.068) (0.047) (0.040) (0.042) (0.078)
Father’s age 33.880 33.838 33.850 34.040 33.949
(0.127) (0.089) (0.078) (0.068) (0.110)
Mother’s age 22.531 22.020 22.603 21.959 21.267
(0.734) (0.445) (0.381) (0.345) (0.512)
Observations 1 429 2 917 4 017 5 109 2 121
*Note: Groups highlighted red are statistically different from the "Dead" group. Mother’s age is the only variable based on the
information from a sample. Number of observations vary across different characteristics due to random missing observations
(less than 2% on average)
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Table 1.3: Means by Disability Levels
Family level variables before the war
Killed 100% II 100% I 90% 80% 70% 60%
Population size 66 068.4 72 528.3 65 369.12 63 624.3 72 224.9 73 483.1 88 603.7
(2 595.4) (13 724.9) (13 986.1) (12 228.6) (8 578.7) (7 172.4) (6 283.1)
Share of Serbs 0.147 0.134 0.119 0.113 0.150 0.138 0.149
(0.002) (0.014) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006)
Commerce 0.089 0.087 0.090 0.091 0.091 0.092 0.094
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Agriculture 0.134 0.133 0.134 0.123 0.140 0.130 0.124
(0.001) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Forestry 0.011 0.018 0.013 0.016 0.011 0.009 0.012
(0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Observations 989 150 95 134 293 502 817
*Note: Groups highlighted red are statistically different from the "Killed" group. Number of observations vary across different
characteristics due to random missing observations (less than 2% on average)
Table 1.4: Means by Disability Levels
Family level variables before the war
50% 40% 30% 20% Uninjured
Population size 76 590.9 78 314.9 75 080.8 59 538.98 58 428.65
(4 280.4) (3 084.4) (2 834.5) (2 478.2) (4 369.8)
Share of Serbs 0.137 0.130 0.128 0.118 0.135
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Commerce 0.093 0.090 0.093 0.093 0.091
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Agriculture 0.128 0.133 0.125 0.124 0.128
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Forestry 0.010 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 1 429 2 917 4 017 5 109 2 121
*Note: Groups highlighted red are statistically different from the "Dead" group. Number of observations vary across different
characteristics due to random missing observations (less than 2% on average)
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Table 1.5: Paternal Mortality and High School GPA
Dependent variable: GPA per school year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Father died -0.103*** -0.128*** -0.044 -0.107*** -0.130*** -0.056 -0.129***
(0.027) (0.039) (0.040) (0.027) (0.039) (0.040) (0.028)
Family size - - - -0.004 -0.003 -0.015** -0.009*
- - - (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Controls - - - - - - yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Unit FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
School FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Gender all boys girls all boys girls all
Constant 4.076*** 4.607*** 4.035*** 4.086*** 4.622*** 4.075*** 3.318***
(0.197) (0.042) (0.120) (0.200) (0.051) (0.130) (0.400)
Observations 68 465 33 688 34 777 68 465 33 688 34 777 68 320
*Note: Significance at the 10% level is indicated by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***; SE are clustered at
unit level. The baseline group are pooled disabled 20 to 100% and uninjured fathers.
Table 1.6: Paternal Mortality and High School Absence
Dependent variable: Absence per school year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Father died 25.362*** 27.379*** 23.236*** 24.489*** 26.905*** 21.905*** 13.862***
(3.507) (4.746) (4.463) (3.552) (4.668) (4.615) (3.402)
Family size - - - -1.224** -0.669 -1.833*** -0.329*
- - - (0.491) (0.682) (0.648) (0.629)
Controls - - - - - - yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Unit FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
School FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Gender all boys girls all boys girls all
Constant 45.474 -6.127 43.921 47.519 -2.958 47.374 102.428**
(35.053) (3.342) (34.544) (35.154) (4.806) (34.493) (44.044)
Observations 70 152 34 640 35 512 70 152 34 640 35 512 69 992
*Note: Significance at the 10% level is indicated by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***; SE are clustered at
unit level. The baseline group are pooled disabled 20 to 100% and uninjured fathers.
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Table 1.7: Paternal Mortality and High School Behaviour
Dependent variable: School behaviour
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Father died -0.169*** -0.176*** -0.156*** -0.169*** -0.179*** -0.160*** -0.077***
(0.024) (0.035) (0.042) (0.025) (0.037) (0.043) (0.025)
Family size - - - 0.001 -0.004 -0.005 -0.009
- - - (0.004 ) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
Controls - - - - - - yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Unit FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
School FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Gender all boys girls all boys girls all
Constant 3.110*** 3.357*** 3.130*** 3.109*** 3.378*** 3.143*** 2.918***
(0.140) (0.046) (0.126) (0.140) (0.064) (0.129) (0.183)
Observations 68 975 33 921 35 054 68 975 33 921 35 054 68 828
*Note: Significance at the 10% level is indicated by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***; SE are clustered at
unit level. The baseline group are pooled disabled 20 to 100% and uninjured fathers.
Table 1.8: Paternal Mortality and Injuries
Dependent variable: Injury and Number of Injuries
Injuries Injuries Injuries Num injuries Num injuries Num injuries
Father died 1.360** 1.276 1.686 0.015* 0.017 0.014
(0.183) (0.205) (0.572) (0.008) (0.014) (0.011)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Gender all boys girls all boys girls
Observations 51 161 25 512 25 649 37 267 18 772 18 495
*Note: Significance at the 10% level is indicated by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***; First three columns
are incident rate ratios of Poisson model. Last three columns are OLS estimations. The baseline group are pooled disabled 20
to 100% and uninjured fathers.
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Table 1.9: Father Exposure and High School GPA
Dependent variable: GPA per year
(Uter) (0-1) (1-2) (2-3) (3-4) (4+)
Father died -0.173** -0.061 -0.149 0.040 -0.120 -0.217
(0.078) (0.069) (0.093) (0.115) (0.169) (0.344)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Unit FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
School FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 4.666*** 3.067*** 3.665*** 2.713*** 5.011** 2.013
(0.698) (0.555) (0.851) (0.776) (2.287) (1.416)
Observations 4 653 4 558 3 367 1 853 1 071 442
*Note: Significance at the 10% level is indicated by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***; SE are clustered at
unit level.
Table 1.10: Father Exposure and High School Absence
Dependent variable: School Absence
(Uter) (0-1) (1-2) (2-3) (3-4) (4+)
Father died 16.292** 11.499** 13.206* 2.523 12.240 41.423
(7.384) (5.840) (7.634) (8.927) (16.133) (60.026)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Unit FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
School FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 74.241 126.284*** 193.902*** 168.300 547.448*** 283.505
(63.015) (43.313) (73.230) (124.836) (189.929) (213.581)
Observations 4 785 4 672 3 445 1 891 1 097 448
*Note: Significance at the 10% level is indicated by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***; SE are clustered at
unit level.
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Table 1.11: Father Exposure and High School Behaviour
Dependent variable: School behaviour
(Uter) (0-1) (1-2) (2-3) (3-4) (4+)
Father died -0.111* -0.020 -0.092 0.177 0.100 -0.525
(0.066) (0.050) (0.069) (0.107) (0.165) (0.353)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Unit FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
School FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 2.922*** 2.820*** 1.694** 2.111** 5.860*** 1.864
(0.503) (0.498) (0.849) (0.972) (1.699) (2.217)
Observations 4 696 4 596 3 394 1 886 1 084 451
*Note: Significance at the 10% level is indicated by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***; SE are clustered at
unit level.
Table 1.12: Father Exposure and Injuries
Dependent variable: Injuries
(Uter) (0-1) (1-2) (2-3) (3-4) (4+)
Father died 3.086*** 1.440 0.628 0.802 0.825 2.060
(1.094) (0.434) (0.248) (0.311) (0.637) (1.394)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2 132 2 276 1 815 1 015 658 368
*Note: Significance at the 10% level is indicated by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***; SE are clustered at
unit level. The estimates are incident rate ratios of a Poisson model
48
Table 1.13: Paternal Disabilities and Children Outcomes
Dependent variables:
GPA Absence Behaviour Injuries
Father died -0.132*** 13.525*** -0.066** 1.437 **
(0.030) (3.609) (0.026) (0.221)
100% disabled II -0.181*** 6.258 -0.128*** 1.114
(0.058) (4.957) (0.048) (0.293)
100% disabled I -0.172*** 11.367** -0.096 1.508
(0.057) (5.470) (0.067) (0.618)
90% disabled 0.023 -1.897 -0.014 1.277
(0.049) (7.116) (0.058) (0.327)
80% disabled - 0.344 5.083 -0.016 1.144
(0.047) (4.214) (0.034) (0.217)
70% disabled 0.030 -3.750 0.008 1.008
(0.027) (2.496) (0.028) (0.182)
60% disabled 0.001 0.302 0.003 0.859
(0.029) (2.431) (0.023) (0.132)
50% disabled - 0.017 -0.570 0.005 1.138
(0.023) (1.950) (0.018) (0.130)
Controls yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes no
Unit FE yes yes yes no
School FE yes yes yes no
Gender all all all all
Constant 3.326*** 99.848** 2.912*** -
(0.406) (44.156) (0.185) -
Observations 68 320 69 992 68 828 51 161
*Note: Significance at the 10% level is indicated by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***;
SE are clustered at unit level. The lower level disabilites(40-20%) are excluded from the table because of exposition purposes,
but are estimated in this model and all insignificant. The baseline category in this estimation are uninjured fathers.
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Table 1.14: Exposure to Father and Children’s Outcomes by Sibling Pairs
Dependent variables:
 GPA  Absence   Behaviour Observations
Independent variable:  Time Exposure
Regressions by groups:
Father died 0.049 8.570 -0.075 127
(0.077) (6.479) (0.076)
100% disabled II 0.023 1.173 -0.028 84
(0.048) (4.257) (0.041)
100% disabled I -0.089 0.012 -0.004 48
(0.062) (5.586) (0.056)
90% disabled 0.047 -3.112 -0.039 60
(0.089) (8.829) (0.072)
80% disabled 0.026 -0.183 -0.009 155
(0.046) (3.246) (0.038)
70% disabled 0.010 -0.423 -0.047* 338
(0.026) (2.282) (0.024)
60% disabled 0.038* 2.183 -0.038* 489
(0.021) (1.742) (0.019)
50% disabled 0.009 4.174*** -0.055*** 778
(0.017) (1.506) (0.015)
40% disabled 0.025** 1.928* -0.044*** 1 584
(0.012) (1.064) (0.011)
30% disabled 0.032*** 1.201 -0.044*** 2 350
(0.009) (0.840) (0.008)
20% disabled 0.025*** 3.484*** -0.043*** 3 063
(0.009) (0.699) (0.007)
*Note: Significance at the 10% level is indicated by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***;
Each observation is one sibling pair.   is the difference in dependent and independent variables between older and younger
sibling for all possible permutations of siblings within a family. For each level of disability a separate regression was made.
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1.8 Appendix
Table A1: Means by Killed or Alive
Killed Alive
Number of kids 1.196 1.249
(0.013) (0.004)
Share of male kids 0.514 0.501
(0.015) (0.004)
Average age of kids 1.685 1.849
(0.046) (0.020)
Father’s age 32.705 33.942
(0.158) (0.037)
Mother’s age 25 22.618
(0.974) (0.188)
Observations 989 17 584
*Note: Groups highlighted red are statistically different from the "Killed" group. "Alive" group contains characteristics of both
injured and uninjured soldiers
Table A2: Means by Killed or Alive
Killed Alive
Population size 65 374.2 73 487.7
(2 551.3) (1 314.5)








Observations 989 18 765
*Note: Groups highlighted red are statistically different from the "Killed" group. "Alive" group contains characteristics of both
injured and uninjured soldiers
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Table A3: In-utero Paternal Shock and Gender Differences
Dependent variables:
GPA GPA Absence Absence Behaviour Behaviour Injuries Injuries
Father died -0.092 -0.337*** 25.768** 10.797 -0.019 -0.270** 0.707* 2.717***
(0.095) (0.128) (11.005) (14.069) (0.123) (0.117) (0.392) (0.818)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes no no
Unit FE yes yes yes yes yes yes no no
School FE yes yes yes yes yes yes no no
Gender male female male female male female male female
Observations 2 329 2 324 2 405 2 380 2 352 2 344 1 026 1 106
*Note: Significance at the 10% level is indicated by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***;
SE are clustered at unit level. Last two columns are incident rate ratios of Poisson model.
Table A4: Paternal Mortality and High School GPA 2
Dependent variable: GPA per school year
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Father died -0.140*** -0.089*** -0.108*** -0.126*** -0.135*** -0.119*** -0.099***
(0.051) (0.031) (0.045) (0.045) (0.008) (0.033) (0.037)
Family size -0.014 -0.018** -0.005 -0.010 -0.008 -0.022*** -0.008
(0.009) (0.007) (0.014) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Unit FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
School FE yes yes yes yes yes no yes
Type of school gymnasium all all all all all all
Family income no yes no no no no no
Father type all all draftee volunteers all all all
War exposure - - - - high - -
Unit size - - - - - - small
Gender all all all all all all
Constant 2.154*** 3.372*** 3.977*** 2.984*** 2.971*** 2.774*** 1.940***
(0.343) (0.390) (0.367) (0.329) (0.352) (0.149) (0.314)
Observations 22 007 60 611 19 660 48 660 42 732 68 320 44 397
*Note: Significance at the 10% level is indicated by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***; SE are clustered at
unit level.
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Table A5: Paternal Mortality and High School Absence 2
Dependent variable: Absence per school year
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Father died 9.276** 11.775*** 13.629*** 15.422*** 14.704*** 15.380*** 10.791***
(4.031) (3.542) (4.642) (5.620) (4.765) (3.938) (3.706)
Family size -1.011 0.699 -0.036 -0.265 -0.287 -0.439 -0.519
(0.938) (0.755) (1.327) (0.763) (0.711) (0.787) (0.700)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Unit FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
School FE yes yes yes yes yes no yes
Type of school gymnasium all all all all all all
Family income no yes no no no no no
Father type all all draftee volunteers all all all
War exposure - - - - high - -
Unit size - - - - - - small
Gender all all all all all all all
Constant 328.488*** 100.575** 56.22* 185.781*** 117.773* 143.932*** 132.563***
(58.162) (44.280) (31.471) (30.274) (60.408) (13.289) (43.341)
Observations 22 350 62 118 20 207 49 785 42 716 69 992 45 485
*Note: Significance at the 10% level is indicated by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***; SE are clustered at
unit level.
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Table A6: Paternal Mortality and High School Behaviour 2
Dependent variable: School behaviour
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Father died -0.118*** -0.047* -0.078** -0.083** -0.049* -0.075** -0.065**
(0.034) (0.028) (0.035) (0.033) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030)
Family size -0.001 -0.013** -0.014 -0.008 -0.011 -0.014* -0.006
(0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Unit FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
School FE yes yes yes yes yes no yes
Type of school gymnasium all all all all all all
Family income no yes no no no no no
Father type all all draftee volunteers all all all
War exposure - - - - high - -
Unit size - - - - - - small
Gender all all all all all all all
Constant 1.897*** 2.942*** 3.893*** 2.925*** 3.105*** 2.477*** 2.901***
(0.559) (0.187) (0.356) (0.172) (0.248) (0.138) (0.222)
Observations 22 245 61 066 19 779 49 049 42 072 68 828 44 715
*Note: Significance at the 10% level is indicated by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***; SE are clustered at
unit level.
Table A7: Paternal Mortality and Injuries 2
Dependent variable: Injury
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Father died 1.314* 1.281* 1.403 1.210 1.140
(0.196) (0.193) (0.397) (0.239) (0.238)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes
School activities no - - - -
Family income no yes no no no
Father type all all draftee volunteers all
War exposure - - - - high
Gender all all all all all
Observations 35 563 45 675 13 903 31 772 27 702
*Note: Significance at the 10% level is indicated by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***; SE are clustered at
unit level.
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Table A8: Paternal Mortality and Injuries 3
Dependent variable: Number of injuries
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Father died 0.012 0.009 0.015 0.007 0.002
(0.008) (0.009) (0.018) (0.013) (0.011)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes
School activities no - - - -
Family income no yes no no no
Father type all all draftee volunteers all
War exposure - - - - high
Gender all all all all all
Observations 26 457 33 212 10 020 23 192 20 369




Figure 1.1: GPA by mortality and disability status
Figure 1.2: School behavior by mortality and disability status
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Chapter 2
What’s in a Name in a War
Dejan Kovač and Stepan Jurajda1
Abstract
We implement a novel empirical strategy for identifying and studying a strong form of
nationalism—the willingness to fight and die in a war for national independence—using
name choices corresponding to previous war leaders. Based on data on almost half a
million soldiers, we first show that having been given a first name that is synonymous with
the leader(s) of the Croatian state during World War II predicts volunteering for service
in the 1991-1995 Croatian war of independence and dying during the conflict. Next,
we use the universe of Croatian birth certificates and the information about nationalism
conveyed by first names to suggests that in ex-Yugoslav Croatia, nationalism was on a
continuous rise starting in the 1970s, consistent with Fearon and Laitin (2003), and that
its rise was curbed in areas where concentration camps were located during WWII. We
also link the nationalist values we proxy using first name choices to right-wing voting
behavior in 2015, 20 years after the war. Our evidence on intergenerational transmission
of nationalism is consistent with the trade-off between within-family and society-wide
transmission channels of cultural values proposed by Bisin and Verdier (2001) and it
suggests a mechanism that sustains elevated parochial altruism across generations.
1We would like to thank Orley Ashenfelter, Michal Bauer, Jernej Čopič, Janet Currie, Randall Filer,
Patrick Gaulé, Emir Kamenica, Jan Kmenta, Kateřina Králová, Alexandre Mas, Nikolas Mittag, Vinko
Muštra, Christopher Neilson, Gerard Roland, Raul Sanchez de la Sierra, František Šístek, Vuk Vuković,
Jan Zápal, and Krešimir Žigić for their valuable comments. All mistakes and interpretations are our
own, however. Kovač would also like to thank the Croatian Ministry of Veterans and Ministry of Public
Administration for access to the veteran database and birth certificate database, respectively.
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2.1 Introduction
Nationalism has been a principle driver of wars and of political violence throughout mod-
ern history, particularly in the Balkans (Petersen, 2002; Biondich, 2011). Wars, in turn,
have dramatic, long-lasting effects on a country’s political, cultural, and ethnic identity,
according to a recent body of work based in large part on voting behavior (Mayhew,
2004; Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Anderlini et al., 2010; Petersen, 2012; Fontana et al.,
2016, Ochsner and Roesel, 2016). Experiencing war also strengthens in-group coopera-
tion and altruism towards members of one’s group (Choi and Bowles, 2007; Voors, et al.,
2012; Bauer et al., 2016), i.e., preferences supportive of nationalism. A key unanswered
question in the literature is to what extent the persistence of the effects that wars have
on political values and in-group cooperative behavior is underpinned by intergenerational
transmission of values within families. It has been suggested that intergenerational trans-
mission of political and cultural values affects economic development, political outcomes,
and inter-group and inter-national tensions (e.g., Bisin and Verdier, 2000; Guiso et al.,
2006; Montgomery, 2010; Voigtländer and Voth, 2015), but the study of the effects wars
have on political attitudes across generations is curbed by lack of data.2 There are now
surveys offering direct measures of political values and attitudes across recent genera-
tions (Albanese et al., 2014; Dohmen et al., 2012; Dhar et al., 2016; Jennings, et al.,
2009; Ojedaa and Hatemi, 2015), but such advanced surveys are not available to study
important historical events including wars, which is why research on the persistence of
political and cultural values often relies on indirect measures of values and attitudes (e.g.,
Voigtländer and Voth, 2013; Fouka and Voth, 2013).3
In this paper we implement a novel empirical strategy for identifying and studying
nationalism and its intergenerational transmission based on child name choices corre-
sponding to war leaders.4 Such indirect approach is particularly applicable in countries
that feature a sharply divided ethnic mix and in settings where leaders’ names are noto-
riously associated with their political beliefs. Given the widespread availability of birth
certificate records, the approach naturally lends itself to the study of intergenerational
transmission and is available in many historical settings.
2Most of the work on intergenerational links focuses on easily measured traits such as education
(Currie and Moretti, 2003), welfare dependence (Dahl et al., 2014), and occupational choice (Dal Bó et
al., 2009).
3Lupu and Peisakhin (2017) study the legacy of political violence among Crimean Tatars using the
first available survey of inter-generational transmission of ethnic parochialism.
4Throughout the paper, we could have alternatively used the term patriotism for the values we study.
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Importantly, our approach allows us to measure a strong form of nationalism—the
willingness to fight and die in a war for national independence—that is in principle difficult
to elicit in surveys. This trait is of substantive interest to nations dealing with free-riding
in active war service.5 By linking parents’ memory of a past war to the participation
of their sons in a current war, we provide evidence on how countries solve the collective
action problem of securing sufficient number of volunteers for service in war. While the
literature on nationalism highlights the self-reinforcing relationship between nationalism
and conflict, we document the positive welfare contribution that nationalism can have
within groups engaged in war towards the provision of the most costly public good a
group can ask for—one’s life.
We apply our approach to the study of 20th-century Croatian nationalism. Specif-
ically, we explore the links between WWII in Croatia and the War of Independence
(hereafter WoI) fought between Croatia and Serbia during 1991-1995, one of Europe’s
deadliest conflicts since World War II. We study volunteering for and dying in the WoI
and the intergenerational transmission of values associated with this behavior. In a sub-
set of our analysis, we also link the values we measure during 1991-1995 to parenting
styles and to post-war voting behavior.
As of the start of the WoI in 1991, Croatia had no regular army and so massive
volunteering was critical to its defense, especially before the draft process began.6 We
show that men who share their first name with the notorious leader(s) of the WWII
Croatian state were significantly more likely to volunteer for war service in the Croatian
army and that they were more likely to die during the full-scale armed conflict between
Croats and Serbs. The analysis, based on the complete registry of almost half a million
Croatian veterans of the WoI implies that having a ‘nationalist’ first name predicts costly
patriotic behavior in war, presumably due to values transmitted from parents.
The use of the names corresponding to WWII leaders ebbed in Croatia after WWII,
but these names gained in popularity starting in the 1970s. The rise in the popularity of
nationalist names thus foreshadows the WoI. Using the universe of over 3 million Croatian
male birth certificates from 1930 to 2000, we show that this rise is curbed around the
locations of WWII concentration camps, i.e., places where atrocities were committed by
the Croatian WWII state. We also show that the use of the name corresponding to
5The free-riding issue has been studied in the context of civil wars (e.g., Humphreys and Weinstein,
2008).
6At its peak, the volunteer force in active duty corresponded to about one sixth of the Croatian male
population aged 25 to 54.
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the Croatian WWII leader—Ante—for newborns reaches WWII levels in locations that
experienced high combat exposure during the Croatian-Serbian 1991-1995 war and spikes
dramatically in locations affected by extended enemy siege or occupation after the siege
(occupation) ended in 1995.
We thus demonstrate that first names corresponding to previous war leaders can con-
tain an informative signal about one’s nationalism, a signal that correlates with extreme
war experiences and that predicts the willingness to serve in a war for national inde-
pendence. Armed with our proxy measure, we next inquire about the nature of the
intergenerational transmission of nationalism. We focus on name choices made during
the WoI when the use of nationalist names peaked and test for the presence of a trade-off
between within-family and society-wide transmission channels of traits across generations
suggested by Bisin and Verdier (2001). We find evidence consistent with the presence
of purposeful cultural transmission of nationalism as suggested by their model. In this
regard, our findings are similar to those of Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott (2015),
who uncover intergenerational transmission of war service, but not of military service in
peacetime, in US families.
This evidence is important for the literature studying the choices made by parents on
behalf of their children and their ethnic or national groups. In the models of intergener-
ational transmission of preferences proposed by Akerloff and Kranton (2000) and Bisin
and Verdier (2001), parents see their children’s well-being as depending directly on their
identity (group membership, in our case nationality) and so they transmit group-relevant
values. Algan et al. (2013) suggest that parents are conscious of the costs associated
with name choices. In their case, French Arabic parents consider the labor market costs
of name choices corresponding to their ethnic identity. In our case, Croatian parents
transmit values related to their living memory of war that are of critical importance
to their group (nation) in the next war, even if such values can be extremely costly to
their children. This is consistent with the coevolution of wars with elevated parochial
altruism, defined as increased altruism towards members of one’s group in response to
inter-group conflicts, proposed in the literature on human behavior and evolutionary bi-
ology (e.g., Choi and Bowles, 2007). The body of empirical work summarized in Bauer
et al. (2016) supports the notion that the adaptation of preferences towards adherence
to social norms increases the success of groups during conflicts due to solving collective
action problems. The literature studies the in-group- and out-group-behavioral response
to war experiences, but it has yet to consider the transmission of in-group pro-social or
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out-group potentially hostile preferences across generations. War experiences can lead
one to become more risk-seeking and cooperative within one’s group (as documented by,
e.g., Voors, et al., 2012), and they can also lead one to inculcate such values in one’s
children. Our evidence on intergenerational transmission of values related to war be-
havior thus links the parochial altruism literature with the study of inter-generational
transmission of preferences.
A priori, it is not clear how strongly the values we measure mix nationalism (patrio-
tism) with right-wing political values (Hedl, 2005). We therefore additionally ask about
the association of the nationalist signal in names with right-wing voting patterns in the
2015 Croatian parliamentary elections, twenty years after the war, and find a significant
link. Municipalities with a higher share of Antes among newborns allocate a higher share
of their votes to right-wing parties. Antes are over-represented among candidates of right-
wing parties and receive a disproportionately high share of preferential votes when they
run on right-wing party slates in electoral districts directly affected by the WoI. These
results are in line with the hypothesis that the effects wars have on political behavior is
long-lived (e.g., Fontana et al., 2016). That name choices predict both war behavior and
right-wing voting ties our main findings to the recent evidence of within-family transmis-
sion of right-wing attitudes over generations (Avdeenko and Siedler, 2017; Ochsner and
Roesel, 2016). The signal contained in name choices allows us to simultaneously study
war service, regional patterns of political values, their intergenerational transmission, par-
enting styles, and voting behavior. The measurement approach we implement resembles
that of the research on socioeconomic mobility, which deals with the lack of historical
data by utilizing the fact that names provide a signal about one’s socioeconomic standing
(Clark, 2014; Güell et al., 2015; Olivetti and Paserman, 2015). Our evidence on political
values adds an important dimension to the literature exploring the information content
of child name choices, which already recognizes that the choice of first names can be an
expression of cultural, ethnic, or religious identity (Lieberson, 2000; Fryer and Levitt,
2004; Haan, 2005; Aura and Hess, 2010; Mateos, 2014; Cook et al., 2015; Abramitzky et
al., 2016; Fouka, 2016).
2.2 The War of Independence
In June 1991, Croatia declared its independence from the Yugoslav federation. The Croa-
tian War of Independence, referred to as the Homeland War in Croatia, was waged from
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the summer of 1991 to the end of 1995 between the Croatian army and the Serb-controlled
Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) and local Serb forces opposing secession. During 1991
and 1992, the JNA conducted combat operations in Croatia and helped to establish the
Republic of Serbian Krajina, covering the quarter of Croatian territory mostly corre-
sponding to areas with high shares of ethnic Serbs. After the ceasefire of January 1992,
the front lines were entrenched until 1995, when Croatia launched two offensives known
as Operation Flash and Operation Storm, which effectively ended the war in its favor.
Approximately 20,000 people were killed in the war, most of them civilians.7
Our analysis of behavior during the war is based on the complete registry of military
personnel of the Croatian Ministry of Veterans, which includes information on 480,092
male soldiers serving during the war,8 97% of whom were involved in combat operations.
During the roughly eight million man-months these soldiers spent in active duty during
the war, 6,060 of them (1.3%) were killed in action (KIA)—a category which in our case
includes deaths caused by wounds sustained in action as well as deaths in captivity.9 As
of the start of the war, Croatia had no regular army since the JNA was under Serbian
control. The Croatian army was thus initially formed from volunteers and grew in size
significantly in late 1991, when a draft process began based on the registry of Croatians
who had served earlier in the JNA.10 Figure 1 shows the evolution of the size of the
Croatian army and of its volunteer/draftee composition.11 In total, there were 162,267
male volunteers serving during the war and 317,825 draftees.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of monthly death rates—the ratio of soldiers dying in a
given month to the number of active-duty soldiers as of the start of the month—separately
for volunteers and draftees. The war was at its deadliest in the fall of 1991 (55% of KIA
deaths occurred during the first six months of the war) and in August 1995. Soldiers
drafted during 1991 faced particularly high risk of death. This could be due to selection.
First, volunteers may be relatively more skilled soldiers, especially during the first few
7Although the conflict began as a war for independence, the violence in Yugoslav wars often involved
attempts to create ethnically “pure” states and was waged primarily against civilians (Naimark, 2001).
Tabeau and Bijak (2005) illustrate the difficulty of forming estimates of total casulties in the Yugoslav
wars.
8We exclude from the analysis the 5% of female soldiers who all served in non-combat support jobs.
9In total, 9,378 soldiers died during the war, 7,747 in active duty. For 7,346 of these, we observe
the cause of death: 77% were killed in action. We assume the remaining 401 soldiers were also killed in
action.
10Exemptions from service were possible on health grounds, but were seldom granted (UN, 1995).
11The status of a volunteer is governed by the Croatian Act of Homeland War Veterans; it affects
welfare support available to veterans and their families.
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months of the war.12 Second, volunteers joined the army earlier and served longer; at
a given point in time, they are thus more likely to serve in higher ranks than draftees.
Unfortunately, our data does not include rank and this complicates the analysis of KIA
death determinants as rank is generally negatively correlated with the chances of dying
in a war.
Importantly for our analysis, we observe soldier’s place of birth. As of 2015, Croatia,
a country of over 4 million, consisted of 21 administrative districts (‘županije’), 556 cities
and municipalities (‘općine i gradovi’), and 6,750 settlements (‘naselje’). Most of the
fighting during 1991-1995 occurred in the 10 districts located along Croatia’s eastern
border. Correspondingly, the settlements of Croatia were affected by the war in a most
uneven fashion. Part of our analysis is based on merging the veterans registry with
settlement-level data from the 1991 Croatian census based on the soldiers’ place of birth.
In particular, a set of 177 settlements was directly exposed to extensive combat or was
under extended occupation by the JNA during the war. Hereafter we refer to these
locations as the ‘siege settlements’.13 As of the start of hostilities, Croatia included a
large Serbian minority. Based on the 1991 Census, 78% of Croatia’s inhabitants were
Croats and 12% were Serbs. We do not observe soldiers’ nationality, but infer nationality
from names, as detailed in the next section.
2.3 Nationalist Names
Our first task is to classify the first (male) names appearing in the veteran register. We
are chiefly concerned with studying names linked to the Croatian WWII leadership. But
first, we measure the nationality content of first names in order to identify ethnic Croats
among Croatian army soldiers (who are all citizens of Croatia). We do this in order to
construct a useful benchmark for studying correlates of the Croatian nationalist names
in the multi-national mix of the Croatian army. Our first goal is thus to exclude Serbian
and Muslim veterans from the analysis of nationalist names. We can do so because in the
countries of former Yugoslavia, first names carry a strong nationality signal thanks to the
close link between religion and nationality. As in most European countries, newborns’
names are chosen from a list of first names corresponding to an annual calendar of name
12For example, Ante Gotovina, who became a leading general during the 1995 Operation Storm,
already had combat experience in 1991 when he volunteered for the Croatian army.
13This set is defined in the Croatian Act on Areas of Special State Concern.
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days (which are celebrated similarly to birthdays). Croats are predominantly Catholic
so that parents rely on a Catholic-saint name calendar while Serbs are predominantly
Orthodox and use an Orthodox name calendar. Appendix 2.10.1 provides the details of
this classification. We identify 74% percent of veterans as Croats, which is broadly in
line with the fact that, as of 1991, 78% of Croatia’s inhabitants were ethnic Croats. In
most of our analysis, we thus focus on the 354,773 Croatian army veterans who have
Croatian first names. In this Croatian sub-population of veterans, the basic features
of the veteran registry remain intact including the share of volunteers (at 35% in the
Croatian sub-population, up from 33% in the universe of veterans) and the risks of KIA
deaths (at 1.28%, up from 1.26%).
What names correspond to Croatian WWII leaders? During WWII Croatia was ruled
by the Ustaše movement, which blended fascism, Roman Catholicism, and Croatian na-
tionalism. The military wing of the movement became the army of the Croatian fascist
state and its Ustaše government enacted race laws patterned after those of the Third
Reich. It established concentration camps in Croatia and members of the movement
murdered hundreds of thousands of primarily Serbs, Jews and Roma. The movement was
founded and led (until its dissolution in 1945) by Ante Pavelić, who also acted as dictator
during WWII. We thus consider Ante to be a potentially nationalist name. Ante is a
Croatian form of Anthony and there are distinct alternative versions of Anthony in use
in Croatia (Antun, Anto).14 In addition, we code an indicator corresponding to the first
names (other than Ante) of the politicians and generals who received the most important
Nazi decoration during WWII—the Knighthood of the Independent State of Croatia.
Our purpose is to form a sufficiently wide group of names related to the WWII Croatian
state so as to support (or reject) the interpretation that we attach to the primary nation-
alist name Ante. But this approach leads us to include in the ‘Other nationalist name’
indicator also names that have strong non-Ustaše nationalist connotations. Appendix
2.10.1 discusses the nationalist-name classification in detail.
8,001 Antes served in the Croatian army during the 1991-1995 war, forming a group
of 1.7% of all veterans and 2.3% of the Croatian-name sub-population of veterans. In
addition, 25.9% of Croatian-name veterans (21.4% of all veterans) carry other nationalist
names. These shares suggest over-representation of Antes among those serving in the
war, given the general popularity of these names in Croatia as implied by our secondary
14The name Ante also refers to Ante Starčević, the 19th century Croatian politician and writer who
is considered to be one of the founders of Croatian nationalism.
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data source—the population of Croatian birth certificates from 1930 to 2000, which covers
3,002,491 live male births. As Figure 3 attests, the share of newborn boys named Ante
and the corresponding share of other nationalist names on Croatian birth cohorts follow
a similar pattern. These names, Ante in particular, experienced an increase in popularity
during both WWII and the WoI. Following WWII, their share in birth cohorts declines
by over a half,15 then rebounds during the 1970s and 1980s, which may suggest Croatian
nationalism was increasing long before the breakup of Yugoslavia.16 This pattern is
consistent with the use of these names corresponding to nationalist sentiments. We test
this hypothesis in the next section.
2.4 Names and Behavior in War
2.4.1 Volunteering
Our first question is whether there are nationalist-name patterns in the volunteering be-
havior of Croat males in 1991 and 1992. The goal is to estimate such patterns without
data on non-active reservists, i.e. without a direct sample of the population at risk of
volunteering. As documented in Figure 1, volunteering choices were largely made before
the draft process started in earnest. Given that the draft was name-blind,17 the draftees
names are not selectively picked from the reservist population after volunteering choices
were made, so that our data on volunteers and draftees represent a choice-based sam-
ple. Because unobservables affecting the choice to volunteer directly affect the sampling
probability, which is thus not independent of the dependent variable conditional on the
explanatory variables, consistency requires that we weight the criterion function to be
minimized by the inverse probability of selection (Wooldridge, 1999), which in our case
corresponds to 1 for volunteers and to the cohort-specific draft rates for draftees.18
The first column of Table A1 shows the estimated coefficients from a linear probability
model of the volunteering decision controlling for the step function in age, place-of-birth
15Similar drops in popularity of WWII leader names were experienced in other countries. Benito now
represents under 0.02% of newborn boys in Italy; Adolf vanished from German birth statistics by 1950.
16It is plausible that Croatian nationalism was tacit until it became activated during the ‘Croatian
Spring’ movement of the early 1970s, which called for more rights for Croatia within Yugoslavia, and
which was suppressed by force (Motyl, 2001). We return to the evolution of nationalism in Section 2.5.
17We confirm that the draft was name-blind by combining the birth certificate data with the veteran
data: being named Ante or having another Ustaše name does not predict the name-cohort-specific draft
rate; the effect is close to zero and precisely estimated.
18The cohort-specific draft rates are highest, at 0.35, for the youngest cohorts born after 1973, and
they gradually decline to 0.10 for the 1950 cohort.
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controls, and for the two name indicators of interest. (As motivated in the previous sec-
tion, the base group consists of soldiers with Croatian names.) The regression implies
that Antes are about 6 percentage points more likely to volunteer for service in the WoI
than other Croat males. The difference in volunteering likelihood is somewhat smaller for
those with other nationalist names, but both differences are statistically significant.19 In
column (2), we ask to what extent volunteering patterns may correspond to geographical
differences in the prevalence of nationalist names correlated with the pattern of active
military operations during the war. To this effect, the regression in column (2) addition-
ally controls for a set of district fixed effects and also for an indicator of the place of a
soldier’s birth being under siege (a property defined in the previous section). Further, we
ask to what extent the effects estimated in column (1) correspond to having a generally
popular name. If a name that is popular in Croatia is identified as particularly ‘Croatian’,
then popular names could be nationalistic without any historical reference. Hence, we
also condition on an indicator for popular first names; specifically, for the top-10 most
popular Croatian names (other than Ante, but including the ‘nationalist’ Ivan and Josip)
from the 2001 Census. These additional controls lower the coefficients for the Ante and
‘Other nationalist name’ indicators to about 4 (2) percentage points, respectively. Both
coefficients remain highly statistically significant, but the ‘Other nationalist name’ co-
efficient, which is now chiefly based on names outside of the top-10 list, is statistically
indistinguishable from the top-10-name coefficient.
To shed more light on the importance of having a popular vs. nationalist name,
we additionally estimated the specification from column (2) on the subset of soldiers
with names from the top-10 Croatian name list. When compared to all other top-10
names, Antes were over 2 percentage points more likely to volunteer (and this effect was
statistically significant at the 5% level). Comparing the Ante coefficient to the coefficients
for other specific popular names from the top-10 list implied that the volunteering share
of Antes (conditional on location of birth and age) is statistically significantly larger (at
the 10% level) than that of all other popular names, with the exception of Ivan, which
is included in the ‘Nationalist name’ indicator. Hence, Ante and Ivan are two popular
names that both have historical nationalist connotations and that both strongly predict
19An important concern is that nationalist name choices may be correlated with rural status. All
specifications in Table A1 therefore control for a set of characteristics of soldiers’ places of birth measured
at the detailed level of almost seven thousand settlements as of 1991. The upper panel of Appendix
Table 2.5 additionally shows coefficients corresponding to column (1) of Table A1 estimated for subsets
of birthplaces based on their size and share of agricultural employment. Both coefficients are similar in
size and statistically significant in all subsets.
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volunteering, in comparison to all other Croatian names as well as in comparison to all
popular Croatian names.
Next, we perform a number of robustness checks.20 In column (3), we replicate the
specification from column (2) after excluding the large unit of Civil Defense, which has
a high share of volunteers, but low risks of KIA death. Doing so does not affect the
key estimated coefficients. In column (4) we include in the estimation all veterans of
the WoI, not only those with Croatian names, and we additionally control for having
a Serbian or a Muslim name (as defined in the previous section). This again does not
have any important effect on the estimated coefficients of interest.21 In column (5), we
minimize the chances of including Croatian citizens of non-Croatian nationality in our
analysis by restricting the set of soldiers with Croatian names (used in column (2)) to
its subset consisting of soldiers who were born in settlements that, according to the 1991
census, had over 90% of ethnic Croats in them. The estimates in column (5) are again
fully in line with those in column (2), except that the top-10-name coefficient is no longer
statistically significant.
Our estimates imply that the effect of being named Ante on volunteering is quanti-
tatively comparable to the effect on volunteering generated by one’s birth place being
under enemy siege and that the broader group of other nationalist names also has a sig-
nificant, albeit smaller effect on volunteering. Finally, in column (6) we ask whether the
effects of being Ante and of having another nationalist name differs for soldiers coming
from settlements that are under enemy siege. The interaction-coefficient estimates sug-
gest that being named Ante predicts volunteering particularly strongly in areas that were
most exposed to the war for independence. It may be that the nationalist implications
of being raised as an Ante are particularly strongly activated under direct threat of war.
In settlements under enemy siege, Antes are over 12 percentage points more likely to vol-
unteer than other Croats. This is a large effect considering that the overall volunteering
rate was about 12 percent.
20In addition to robustness checks reported in this paragraph, we also estimated the specification from
column (2) without the choice-based-sample weights and the estimates were not materially affected.
Next, we compared the OLS coefficients reported here to probability derivatives corresponding to a
Probit model. Again, the results were identical for all practical purposes. The results are available upon
request.
21In this specification, we find that compared to the base case of having a Croatian name, having a
Serbian or a Muslim name lowers volunteering probability by 4 and 9 percentage points, respectively.
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2.4.2 KIA Risks
In this section, we ask whether having a nationalist name predicts being killed in action
(KIA) during the WoI for soldiers involved in combat situations. We ask this question to
check (refute or fortify) the interpretation that the volunteering analysis of the previous
section offers: that being called Ante correlates with nationalist (patriotic) values. We
face a major obstacle in the KIA analysis: the lack of soldier rank information. In any
war, higher-ranked soldiers are less likely to die. The rank issue may be particularly
important for volunteers who joined the army first and who may be particularly skilled
soldiers. At a given point in time, volunteers are thus more likely to serve in higher ranks
than draftees. Long-serving draftees are also likely to serve in higher ranks. We therefore
minimize these issues by focusing on draftees and their KIA risk during 1991. Draftees
during the first six months of the war are the group least likely to serve in higher ranks,
and it is also the group facing by far the highest death rates (see Figure 2).
More specifically, for the purpose of the KIA analysis, we first omit soldiers who were
never in combat. This excludes the entire (40-thousand-strong) Civil Defense unit of
the Croatian army, and under 3% of the rest of the army. Within this subset, 1.1% of
draftees and 1.6% of volunteers are KIA. Next, we omit all volunteers and also those
draftees entering service after December 1991. We only consider KIA deaths occurring
during 1991. As a result, we are left with 72,586 draftees with Croatian first names, a
group of which 1.9% is KIA during 1991. The results are presented in Table A2, which
is structured similarly to Table A1. The only difference vis-à-vis the specifications used
in Table A1 is that we always condition on a set of 6 fixed effects corresponding to the
month of army entry (during 1991) in order to minimize the effect of rank differences, to
the extent these are correlated with the length of service, and also, more fundamentally,
in order to control for the length of KIA risk exposure. The basic sets of estimates in
column (1) and (2) are fully consistent with the volunteering effects estimated in the
previous section.22 Antes and, to a lesser extent also those with other nationalist names,
are more likely to be killed in action during the first six months of the war, when the war
was at is deadliest. Compared to the average KIA death rate for early draftees (0.019),
22Note that our focus on draftees and the results of the volunteering analysis imply that the Antes
drafted in 1991 are likely to be less nationalistic than the average Antes in the population. Hence, the
results presented here provide a lower-bound on the effect of being Ante on the chances of being killed
in action. As was the case with volunteering, the Ante coefficients are all large and statistically signifi-
cant when estimated on sub-samples of soldiers’ places of birth based on size and share of agricultural
employment (Table 2.5).
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the Ante coefficient in column (2) increases KIA risks by about a half. The effect of being
from a ‘siege settlement’ is again stronger than the Ante effect and the KIA effect of top-
10 popular names is similar in magnitude to that of the ‘Nationalist name’ indicator,
although it is not precisely estimated in column (2).
We have additionally estimated the specification from column (2) using only top-10
Croatian names, and the Ante coefficient estimated against this narrower benchmark
group was again statistically significant (at the 1% level) and similarly large (at 0.0073).
When compared to all other specific top-10-name coefficients, the Ante coefficient is sta-
tistically significantly larger than all but one (Mario). Hence, combining the volunteering
and KIA evidence, Ante is the only name that consistently predicts behavior in the war
compared to the ‘placebo effects’ of other popular names. As was the case with the
volunteering estimates, the KIA effects are not sensitive to including non-Croatian-name
soldiers (in column (3)) and to studying only soldiers from almost-all-Croatian settle-
ments (in column (4)).23 The Ante coefficient is smaller in column (4), but it remains
highly statistically significant and one cannot reject the hypothesis that it is equal to the
coefficient in column (1).
Finally, in column (6), we ask whether nationalist names predict KIA risks differently
for soldiers who were born in ‘siege settlements’. The effect of being named Ante does not
differ between siege and non-siege settlements. Recall that Antes from ‘siege settlements’
were particularly likely to volunteer (see previous section) and so these highly patriotic
Antes are under-represented in the draftee sample used in the KIA analysis. On the other
hand, those with other nationalist names, for whom being from ‘siege settlements’ did not
increase chances of volunteering, are more likely to be KIA when they come from these
locations most affected by the war. We also obtain a puzzling negative siege interaction
coefficient for the top-10 Croatian names.
Overall, the pattern of volunteering and KIA estimates is strongly consistent with the
hypothesis that nationalist names and Ante in particular provide a significant signal about
one’s nationalistic values as manifested by volunteering in a war of national independence
and dying in the war, which suggests higher risk-taking in combat. Nationalistic values
(presumably inculcated by parents) linked to WWII history matter in the 1991-1995 war.
23We also obtain highly similar effects using the Probit model.
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2.5 The Use of Nationalist Names and War Experi-
ences
A growing literature (discussed in the Introduction) suggests that wars have dramatic
and long-lasting consequences for political identity. In this section, we employ the in-
formation about nationalism conveyed by first names to explore nationalism patterns in
Croatia following WWII and the WoI. While we only have an indirect proxy, it allows a
unique view of the past given the absence of direct historical measures of nationalism.24
Our specific goal is to relate the evolution of the use of nationalist names to traumatic
war events. First, we ask whether the memory of the atrocities perpetrated in Ustaše-
operated concentration camps during WWII has subsequently attenuated nationalistic
tendencies (Macdonald, 2002).25 Next, it has been suggested that reactivation of his-
torical memories by current related events can change behavior dramatically (Fouka and
Voth, 2013; Ochsner and Roesel, 2017). We therefore ask whether the 1991-1995 siege
(during which civilians suffered greatly, see, e.g., Naimark, 2001) and the extent of com-
bat operations (proxied by KIA regional concentration) strengthened regional nationalist
attitudes during the WoI.
The analysis is based on the birth certificate data from 1930-2000 introduced in Sec-
tion 2.3. We match the birth-location strings to three types of locations: (a) 21 ‘high-KIA
locations’ (proxying for exposure to combat operations), (b) 177 ‘siege settlements’ dur-
ing the WoI, and (c) 10 WWII ‘concentration-camp locations’.26 In the veteran data,
KIA deaths during the 1991-1995 war occur in 216 distinct settlements; from these we
denote as high-KIA locations those 21 (one tenth) with the highest share of all KIA
deaths. This list includes notorious battlefront towns (e.g., Vukovar, Osijek) as well as
major cities directly affected by combat operations (e.g., Dubrovnik, Zadar). Each of
these three sets of locations covers a sizeable portion of the Croatian birth population.27
Furthermore, Appendix Figures 2.8, 2.9, and 2.10 show that the three sets of locations are
24The view of the past, however, comes with the cost of making the strong assumption of a constant
nationalistic content of a given name over time.
25In the Jasenovac concentration camp alone, at least 80 thousand perished during WWII, primarily
Serbs, but also Jews, Roma, and anti-fascist Croats. While estimates differ and are not available for all
camps, victim counts range well over 10 thousand for the Jadovno (Gospić) or the Slana (Pag) camp as
well.
26See section 2.2 for definition of the ‘siege settlements’. The major Ustaše-operated concentration-
camp locations in Croatia (Jasenovac, Stara Gradiška, Jadovno near Gospić, Slana on Pag, Metajna,
Sisak, Koprivnica, Jastrebarsko, Osijek, Ðakovo) are taken from Kraus (1996, p. 90).
2714% of births occur in high-KIA locations; 5% (6%) occur in ‘siege’ (concentration-camp) locations.
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geographically diverse. Hence, it is plausible that differences in the evolution of the use of
nationalist names across these locations are not driven by idiosyncratic location-specific
factors. Appendix figure 2.8 shows that in areas where Ustaše-operated concentration
camps were located during WWII, Ante never regains its WWII popularity, not even
during the WoI.28 In contrast, in Figure 2.5 we see a return to the locality-specific WWII-
level popularity of Ante in places where a high share of KIA deaths occurred during the
1991-1995 war. Here, the large spike in Ante popularity during the WoI may correspond
to exposure to combat operations. In both sets of locations, the use of other nationalist
names evolves similarly and is not far from the national pattern.
Finally, Figure 2.6 shows the evolution of the popularity of nationalist names in loca-
tions that were under Serbian siege or occupation during the 1991-1995 war; hence, it is
natural that the share of Croatian nationalist names there is low during the war. After the
war, however, the shares of nationalist names increases dramatically. The share of Antes
surpasses WWII levels.29 This pattern likely corresponds in part to declining shares of
the Serbian population not captured by our Serbian- and Muslim-name indicator, which
limits the use of the siege locations for the analysis of intergenerational transmissions of
nationalism (in the next section). Nonetheless, the spike in the prevalence of nationalist
names after the WoI in these locations is suggestive of the nationalist content of these
names.30
The descriptive analysis presented in this section is consistent with nationalist senti-
ments (as reflected in the use of Ante for newborns) reacting strongly to war exposure
during 1991-1995 and being affected by long-lived memories of WWII atrocities, but it
cannot provide strong evidence on these issues since we cannot fully control for location-
specific unobservables. Values corresponding to nationalist names choices can evolve
differently across various contexts. There are two specific potential issues with our inter-
pretation of Figure 4 as suggesting that memories of WWII atrocities curb nationalism:
First, while geographically dispersed, concentration-camp location choices may have been
skewed towards Ustaše strongholds. If so, however, one would expect the rise of the pop-
ularity of the name Ante since the 1970s to be stronger there, not weaker. Second, it
28During WWII, the popularity of Ante in the concentration-camp locations was comparable to that
in the rest of Croatia (shown in Figure 2.4 ), but it remained about one percentage point below the
national level since the end of WWII.
29Also, both shares are statistically significantly above the Croatia-wide shares of the late 1990s.
30This pattern may correspond to the reactivation of past memories suggested by Fouka and Voth
(2013). It is also plausible that it is related to the prominence of Ante Gotovina, a leading Croatian
general.
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is plausible that there is stigma attached to the name Ante in the concentration camp
locations thanks to the WWII atrocities, even if nationalism is in fact not affected by
these experiences. In the presence of such stigma, only those with very high levels of
nationalism would choose the name Ante for their sons, implying that the name Ante
would have a stronger predictive power for our volunteering and KIA outcomes in the
concentration-camp locations. In fact, the Ante coefficients corresponding to the soldiers
born in concentration camp locations are smaller, even if not statistically significantly so,
compared to the coefficients reported in columns (1) of Tables A1 and A2.
2.6 Intergenerational Transmission of Nationalism
There is much work in economics, evolutionary anthropology, sociology, political sci-
ence, and social psychology studying how preferences, beliefs, and norms are transmitted
through generations, and in particular the role of social interactions (Bisin and Verdier,
2010). Whether direct vertical cultural transmission of traits within families acts as a
substitute or complement to the oblique transmission from the society has implications
for the dynamics of cultural traits in the society. This literature on cultural (as opposed
to evolutionary) transmission has studied various elements of preferences including the
discount factor, the importance of education, corruption tendencies, and the (strongly
persistent) relevance of ethnic and religious values. We extend this research by analyzing
the intergenerational transmission of nationalist values, which in our context predict the
provision of the most costly public good a group can ask for—one’s life.
The results provided above suggest that the experience of the 1991-1995 war, when
the use of nationalist names was peaking in Croatia, offers an important case to study
the intergenerational transmission of nationalism. We therefore focus our analysis on
nationalist-name transmission during the independence war, i.e., for boys born during
1991 to 1995. This is also the period during which we established the nationalist signal
(information content) of nationalist names in Section 2.4 for adult male cohorts of poten-
tial fathers. To assess the extent to which nationalism spreads through intergenerational
transmission, we again rely on the birth certificate data and study first name choices for
sons depending on whether their fathers have a nationalist name.
The Bisin and Verdier (2001) model allows values to be transmitted either directly
from parents to offspring or ‘obliquely’ by offspring interacting with society outside the
family. It predicts that there is substitution between intergenerational transmission of
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cultural or political traits and the oblique transmission from society at large. In our
context, this suggests that nationalist fathers may invest less in inculcating nationalist
values (may be less likely to transmit a nationalist name) if there is a strong chance that
those values will be passed on by a local society where they are widespread. We thus test
whether the Ante-Ante (nationalist-nationalist) transmission is weaker for fathers with
nationalist names in locations where the prevalence of nationalist names is stronger.31 An
alternative, simpler, explanation for nationalist-name geographic patterns is that name
choices of all parents (nationalist or not) co-move with regional trends of name popularity
driven by cultural or political factors.
The first two columns of Table A3 show regression coefficients from specifications
explaining an indicator for a newborn son being given the name Ante; the remaining
columns correspond to regressions explaining the choice of any nationalist name (including
Ante).32 These regressions are estimated separately for fathers with nationalist names
(including Ante) and those with other Croatian names. To test for the presence of
substitution between within-family transmission and that provided by the society, we
condition on the pre-war share of nationalist names at the municipality level.33 Similar to
the analysis in Section 2.4, we also condition on several municipality characteristics. The
pre-war shares are measured in municipalities with births in the five-year period prior to
the 1991-1995 war. We follow up on the analysis provided in the previous section and also
condition on binary indicators for the concentration-camp and high-KIA locations. The
average share of Antes on boys born during the pre-war period is 1.4% and the average
share is lower, at 0.5%, in the concentration camp locations and similar to the national
average, at 1.2%, in the high-KIA locations.34 The regression coefficients for the pre-war
shares test the prediction of the ‘oblique’ transmission channel from the Bisin and Verdier
(2001) model applying to nationalist fathers vs. the simpler alternative of area-specific
name-popularity trends affecting all fathers. In line with the model’s prediction, we find
that fathers named Ante are less likely to transmit their name to their sons during a war
of national independence when the share of Antes is generally high in their municipality.
31We are not primarily interested in comparing the Ante-Ante rate to other same-name transmission
rates; rather, we study geographic differences in the nationalist-nationalist and non-nationalist-nationalist
rates.
32We include Ante in the ‘Nationalist name’ indicator to lower the number of transition types.
33We are able to match most of the birth records to one of the Croatian municipalities. The match
rate is over 90% for cohorts born after 1990.
34There is little difference across the groups of locations in terms of the pre-war shares of all nationalist
names: the averages are all between 19% and 21%. However, within each group of locations, the share
ranges from about 10% to about 40%.
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For fathers not named Ante, however, we find that the share of Antes in one’s area is
positively associated with the share of Antes among newborns. The estimates in column
(1) also imply that the use of nationalist names is lower by Ante fathers during the 1991-
1995 war in the concentration-camp locations relative to the rest of Croatia. Based on
the name whose use is most sensitive to the wars our analysis covers, we find evidence
consistent with nationalist fathers (named Ante) being less likely to transmit nationalist
names when they reside in an area (a) affected by long-lived memory of WWII atrocities
related to the history of nationalism,35 and (b) where nationalism is prevalent in the
regional society at large. This evidence is consistent with nationalist fathers purposefully
reflecting the transmission trade-off between family and society channels captured by the
Bisin and Verdier (2001) model.36 It may be that Ante fathers frequently choose the
name Ante for their sons born outside of the highly nationalist 1991-1995 period.37
However, for fathers who are less nationalist as implied by our name proxy, we find
(in column (2)) that they use the name Ante in tandem with the overall popularity of the
name in their region and that they do not behave differently depending on the historical
experience of their region. The results in column (3) and (4), which study the broad
group of nationalist names (including Ante), are consistent with most of these fathers
not recognizing the family vs. society (oblique) transmission trade-off and following
the general area-specific name-popularity trends when choosing their sons’ names.38 The
three positive coefficients corresponding to pre-war shares of nationalist names are similar
in magnitude; under our interpretation of nationalist name choices, they imply that during
the war, i.e. during a spike in nationalism, the regional structure of nationalism reinforced
itself.39
35See Iwanowsky and Madestam (2017) for a similar finding based on the Khmer Rouge political
violence.
36This interpretation assumes that Ante fathers in a high-Ante-share location are equally nationalistic
as Ante fathers in a low Ante-share-location.
37With information on first names of fathers and sons alone we cannot link birth certificates by father
identity and so we do not know whether Ante fathers are more likely to use the name Ante for their
first-born sons or not. The share of boys born to fathers named Ante is similar during the pre-war
five-year period and the 1991-1995 war period.
38These results are robust to including names that are not on the (Croatian) Catholic calendar. We
also interacted the two location types with the pre-war municipality shares of nationalist names, but
none of the interactions reached conventional levels of statistical significance in any of the specifications.
39An important potential issue with the intergenerational analysis is that we do not control for socio-
economic characteristics of families. However, the estimated intergenerational transmission coefficients
are not materially affected by controlling for municipality characteristics or by conditionin on a set of 21




Our preceding analysis of intergenerational transmission of nationalism was conducted
in absence of direct evidence on parenting choices of fathers with nationalist names and
those of other fathers. The purpose of this section is to provide initial indirect evidence
on parenting strategies. Specifically, we ask whether secondary-school in-class behavior
of sons born during 1991-1995 depends on whether their fathers have a nationalist name.
In-class behavior (i.e., well-behaved vs. unruly) is plausibly related to the degree to
which fathers choose an authoritative parenting style, which, in turn, is plausibly related
to nationalism.40 We observe 2008-2012 grades corresponding to high-school in-class
behavior for the population of 5,625 sons born during 1991-1995 to veterans of the war for
Croatian independence and we study the average of these grades over the 5-year period.41
The regression we estimate controls for a step function in fathers’ years of age and is based
on the subset of veterans with Croatian first names (as in Section 2.4); this limits the
analysis to 4,243 sons. Other than fathers’ age, the regression also controls for fathers’
place-of-birth characteristics used in Section 2.4, namely size, share of employment in
agriculture, and share living abroad. Sons of Ante fathers are statistically significantly
less likely (at the 5% level) to have behavioral issues reflected in grades while we detect no
(economically or statistically) significant effect of other nationalist names.42 The ‘Ante’
effect on behavior grades corresponds to 5% of the standard deviation in behavior grades.
While this evidence is certainly limited, it is consistent with Ante fathers choosing more
authoritative parenting strategies, which is plausible for strongly nationalist fathers.
Finally, we complement our main analysis of intergenerational transmission by asking
whether veterans of the 1991-1995 war who experienced extreme carnage in their military
units during the war are more likely to give their sons nationalist names. This sheds light
on the effect of close exposure to violence of war on nationalism. For a sub-set of the
veterans who were seriously injured or killed in the war, we observe the names of their
children. More specifically, we observe the names and birth dates of children of the 23,354
veterans who collected veteran benefits linked to their injury during the war or who died
40See Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott (2015) for a similar approach.
41We omit from the analysis of parenting styles sons of fathers who died or were severely injured during
the war as such traumatic experience is likely to have a first-order effect on child outcomes. See Kovac
(2017) for an exploration of this separate question. Kovac (2017) also describes the school data in more
detail. The war-service injury-type information comes from the veteran database we employ in Section
2.4.
42The ‘Ante’ and ‘Other nationalist name’ coefficients (standard errors) are -0.0284 (0.0141) and -
0.0093 (0.0194), respectively.
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in the war and whose families claimed the benefits.43 This sub-sample of veterans, which
is selected on having been at least partially disabled during the war, also allows us to ask
whether veteran father-son name transitions align qualitatively with our main findings.
The answer is that they do. First, we ask about the effects of soldiers’ exposure to
carnage measured using the maximum monthly share of their unit that was killed in the
war. For fathers who did not die during the war and who had sons born after their war
service, the higher the exposure to carnage in their unit, the lower the probability of
transmitting both Ante and the other nationalist names to their sons.44 For volunteers,
a one standard deviation increase of the unit death rate measure translates to a half a
percentage point reduction in the probability of calling one’s name Ante after the war.45
Next, we find that, conditional on standard place-of-birth controls, volunteers named
Ante who have at least one son born before the war are 4.5 percentage points (statistically
significantly) more likely to have named (one of) their son(s) born before the war Ante,
but there is no such relationship present for the draftees. This is consistent with volunteer
(but not draftee) Ante fathers considering their name as an expression (symbol) of their
nationalist beliefs. We obtain similar results for the transmission of any nationalist name.
These results are tentative due to the selected nature of the sample. Future research could
employ our approach for identifying political values and the intergenerational transmis-
sion thereof for random samples of veterans or civilians differentially exposed to violent
conflicts.
2.7 Voting Behavior
How strongly do the nationalist (patriotic) values we proxy using name choices overlap
with right-wing political values? To answer this question, in this section we examine the
association of the nationalist signal in names with right-wing voting patterns in the 2015
Croatian parliamentary elections. We focus on the 2015 elections for two reasons.46 First,
this is the most recent regular parliamentary contest in Croatia, one that occurred twenty
43See Kovač (2017) for more details on this data.
44These results are presented in the Appendix Table 2.6. The regressions, which are are again based
on the subset of veterans with Croatian first names (as in Section 2.4), control for a step function in
fathers’ years of age and for the standrd set of characteristics of fathers’ places of birth.
45These effects are consistent with those Iwanowsky and Madestam (2017) uncover in their study of
the effects of Khmer Rouge political violence on political values of survivors.
46As Yugoslavia did not run free multi-party elections, we are not able to study the effects of WWII
events on post-WWII voting behavior in Croatia.
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years after the WoI. A growing literature (e.g., Fontana, et al., 2016) suggests that wars
have long-lived effects on countries’ political identity. Within this line of work, Glaurdić
and Vuković (2016) study post-1995 voting patterns in Croatia and uncover a stable
electoral advantage of the party that led the country during the War of Independence—the
Croatian Democratic Union (CDU)—in areas more heavily affected by the war. We ask a
related question within our investigation of the nationalist signal of names corresponding
to war leaders, namely, whether voting shares of right-wing parties twenty years after
the war correlate across municipalities with shares of nationalist names (as defined in
our main analysis) among newborns. In short, are regional preferences expressed in name
choices correlated (conditional on municipality controls) with right-wing voting behavior?
Second, the 2015 elections were the first in Croatia that made it possible for voters
to cast preferential votes in support of individual candidates as opposed to voting only
on the entire slate of candidates of a given party. This allows us to ask two additional
questions: Are nationalist names over-represented among candidates on the slates of
right-wing parties? And do nationalist names receive a disproportionately high share of
preferential votes (within slates) when they appear on right-wing slates? If Antes are not
only more patriotic during wars, but also more right-wing oriented during peacetime, one
would expect them to be over-represented on the slates of right-wing parties. Similarly, if
right-leaning voters expect (based on the name signal) or know (based on direct knowledge
of candidates) Antes to be strong representatives of right-wing values, they will allocate
them with a higher share of preferential votes on the slates of right-wing parties.
The 2015 elections were won by the centre-right CDU and its coalition. We define a
‘Right-wing party’ indicator to correspond to the six parties that were to the right of the
CDU; this set, which includes far-right parties, obtained 4% of the total vote in 2015.47 We
observe party-specific vote shares across all 556 Croatian cities and municipalities. In the
first part of our analysis, we merge this information with place-of-birth-specific shares of
Antes and of other nationalist names (defined in Section 2.3). Not all municipalities have
births. The resulting sample, which combines information on the nationalist-name shares
among newborn boys with the 2015 vote share of right-wing parties covers 401 cities and
municipalities.48 When regressing the location-specific vote share of the right-wing parties
47In the absence of an authoritative study on the right-wing spectrum of Croatian politics, we rely on
the Wikipedia entry for the 2015 Croatian elections, which classifies the following parties as right-wing
or far-right: the Democratic Union of National Renewal, the Croatian Conservative Party, the Family
Party, the Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja, In the Name of the Family – Project
Homeland, Croatian Dawn – Party of the People.
48We report results based on the share of nationalist names among boys born during 1970-2000, which
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on the share of Antes among newborns, we obtain a coefficient of 0.09, which is significant
at the 5% level (based on robust standard errors). The coefficient estimate corresponding
to other nationalist names is a precisely estimated zero. The regression controls for
municipality share of agricultural employment and average years of education, both from
2000, and for an indicator of a given municipality having been heavily affected by the
WoI.49 Increasing the share of Antes among newborns by five percentage points, which
corresponds to a one standard deviation increase, is thus associated with the municipality
vote share of right-wing parties being about a half of a percentage point higher (relative
to the mean of 4%).
Next, we turn to the analysis of candidate names and of preferential votes. Parties
can nominate slates of candidates for each of the ten main Croatian electoral districts
(no candidate can appear on multiple slates). In the 2015 parliamentary elections, these
slates included 2,170 distinct candidates, but our analysis is based only on the 1,216
male candidates, who correspond to 155 district-party-specific slates. Our first finding
is that, compared to slates of other parties, slates of right-wing parties exhibit a 50%
higher share of both Ante candidates and of candidates with other nationalist names.50
To study preferential voting behavior, we focus on the share of preferential votes received
by a given candidate on all preferential votes received by his (district-party-specific) slate.
The analysis thus implicitly conditions on all party-district-specific factors determining
voting preferences corresponding to a given slate as well as on the average propensity to
use preferential votes within slates. Regressing the candidates’ preferential-vote share on
our two nationalist name indicators results in two positive coefficients shown in column
(1) of Table A4. Both coefficient estimates are sizeable given that the 25/75 percentile
range of candidates’ shares on preferential votes received by their slate is 0.02/0.08. When
we interact the two name indicators with the right-wing dummy, the Ante interaction is
large and together with the Ante coefficient it is jointly statistically significant at the
5% level. The other interaction coefficient is close to zero.51 In columns (3) and (4), we
re-estimate specifications from columns (1) and (2) for the six electoral districts adjacent
allows us to maximize municipality coverage, but we obtain nearly identical estimates when relying on
the corresponding shares from 1995-2000 from municipalities with births in that period.
49Unlike the siege indicator used in our main analysis, which is based on settlements defined as of 1991,
this indicator, which is taken from Glaurdić and Vuković (2016), is coded at the level of municipalities
defined as of 2000. See Section 2.2 for definitions of Croatian geographic units.
50This difference is statistically significant for other (non-Ante) nationalist names.
51These results are not sensitive to conditioning on electoral-district fixed effects, party fixed effects,
or the right-wing-party indicator, consistent with our focus on within-slate differences.
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to Croatia’s eastern border, i.e., for the electoral districts directly affected by the WoI.
The remaining columns show coefficients based on the remaining districts. Candidates
named Ante receive a sizably higher share of preferential votes cast for right-wing slates
in electoral districts affected by the WoI.
Our main analysis focuses on the behavioral signal of nationalist names during wars.
When we additionally investigate the voting-behavior content of nationalist names in
peacetime, we obtain first-step tentative results that are consistent with the notion of
long-lived effects of wars on political identity and that support an association of nation-
alist (patriotic) behavior in a war with right-wing voting patterns twenty years after the
war. That name choices predict both war behavior and right-wing election behavior links
our main set of findings to the recent evidence on within-family transmission of right-wing
attitudes over generations (Avdeenko and Siedler, 2017; Ochsner and Roesel, 2016).
2.8 Conclusions
In this paper, we demonstrate that name choices corresponding to war leaders can predict
offspring’s adult-life behavior in a life-and-death situation—in a war for national inde-
pendence. The effect of sharing one’s first name with the leader of the WWII Croatian
state on volunteering for war service during the 1991-1995 war is comparable to that gen-
erated by one’s birth place being under enemy siege or occupation. Having such a name
also increases the risks of being killed in action by about 50% compared to the average
risk level. The values approximated by first name choices corresponding to previous war
leaders are also plausibly associated with the choice of an authoritative parenting style
and are linked to right-wing voting behavior in peacetime.
These findings have value added on several fronts. First, our evidence on the signal
value that names chosen by parents (and, hence, presumably values inculcated by parents)
have for offspring’s behavior in a deadly conflict supports the notion that political identity
matters in high-stakes decisions. This is relevant for the growing literature measuring
political identity (e.g., Bursztyn et al., 2014; Rico and Jennings, 2016). Since first names
can carry a meaningful signal about nationalism (patriotism), they can be used to study
the spread of such values, and, potentially, as input into the study of ethnic and civil
conflicts (e.g., Rivera, 2008; Novta, 2016; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2016).
Second, we provide novel evidence on the intergenerational transmission of values that
are in principle difficult to elicit in surveys. We support the notion of cultural purposeful
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transmission of values for values that can be extremely costly to children. Our findings are
consistent with fathers who have strong nationalist views acting upon the nationalism-
transmission trade-off between within-family and society-wide channels suggested by the
Bisin and Verdier (2001) model of purposeful intergenerational transmission of values.
Other fathers, however, simply appear to follow the regional trends in their name choices
for newborn sons. We also suggest that nationalist-name choices are plausibly associated
with authoritative parenting styles. These findings are similar to those Campante and
Yanagizawa-Drott (2015) uncover in their study of intergenerational transmission of war
service across several US wars.
Third, our study of the active engagement in the delivery of an extremely costly
public good suggests that the living memory of a previous war allows nations to deal
with the collective action problem of participation in a current war. Here, our results are
also complementary to those provided by Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott (2015). In
comparison to their examination of US war service decisions, we study war participation
in an extreme situation of massive volunteering and dying in a war.52
Fourth, our analysis suggests a link between the study of inter-generational trans-
mission of preferences and the research on parochial altruism. Specifically, it suggests
that the elevation of parochial altruism induced by direct war experiences (Voors et al.,
2012; Bauer et al., 2016) can be made persistent through intergenerational transmission
of values. Our empirical strategy can be employed to test intergenerational versions of
questions posed by the parochial altruism literature. For example, are name choices cor-
responding to war leaders associated with stronger contributions to nation building after
the conflict? Does the intergenerational transmission of values related to previous war
experiences (as reflected in name choices) lead to persistent biases53 and sow the seeds of
future conflicts?
Fifth, we find that name choices corresponding to previous war leaders predict not only
patriotic behavior in a current war for national independence, but also voting behavior
in peacetime. Our first-step investigation of the right-wing-voting content of nationalist
names provides support for the growing literature (e.g., Fontana, et al., 2016) arguing
that the effects of wars on political identity are long-lived and depend on the extent of
direct war experience. It also relates our main set of findings to the recent evidence
52Our analysis is related to Shesterinina (2016) who argues that social structures channel information
that is critical for mobilization decisions in the Georgian-Abkhaz war of 1992–93.
53Shayo and Zussman (2017) ask about the persistence of the effects of conflicts on bias towards
co-ethnics.
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on intergenerational transmission of right-wing attitudes (Avdeenko and Siedler, 2017;
Ochsner and Roesel, 2016).
Finally, we provide new evidence on the Croatian War of Independence. In the Croat-
ian case, and possibly more generally during the decades when six distinct nations shared
the Yugoslav federation, names carried an informative signal, accumulated through his-
tory, geography, and ethnic identity, about their owners’ political values.54 This allows
us to use name choices as a group-level signal of political preferences. The use of names
of Croatian WWII leaders, which was high during WWII but ebbed later, rebounds
starting in the 1970s and peaks during the 1991-1995 War of Independence.55 In WWII
concentration-camp locations, the popularity of these names never regains its WWII pop-
ularity, not even during the War of Independence.56 In contrast, the use of nationalist
names reaches local WWII levels immediately after Croatian control is re-established in
locations that were under extended Serbian siege or occupation during the independence
war and in areas with high exposure to combat operations during the war. One view
of the Yugoslav wars is that after years of peaceful coexistence, violence erupted unex-
pectedly (e.g., Bardhan, 2005, p. 169). Our evidence on the nationalistic content of the
Ustaše-linked name Ante together with the continuous rise in the popularity of nationalist
names during the 1970s and 1980s is perhaps better aligned with the alternative notion
that internal wars stem from accumulation of protracted sentiments and conflicts (Fearon
and Laitin, 2003), and that the strength of nationalism in Croatia was increasing for over
a decade before the war erupted.
Our measurement approach is applicable to periods of heightened nationalist tensions
and to internal or external conflicts where leader’s names are notoriously associated with
their actions and political beliefs. For instance, if one finds that the use of names corre-
sponding to leaders of Nazi Germany is over-represented among supporters of right-wing
parties in post-WWII Germany, one could use accessible name statistics to map the evo-
lution of such values over populations not covered by survey data directly eliciting such
54While we focus on names linked to the fascist history of Croatia, left-wing and, indeed, anti-fascist
forces have always been strong in Croatia. The Yugoslav Partisan movement during WWII, which in
Croatia included disproportionate shares of Serbian fighters and leaders, is often considered Europe’s
most effective anti-Nazi resistance movement. Anti-fascist Croatians were among the victims of the
Ustaše dictatorship.
55First names corresponding to the dukes and kings of independent Croatia, i.e., of Croatian rulers
from the 9th, 10th, and 11th century, also became dramatically more popular during the 1970s and also
experienced a spike during the War of Independence. There are too few men born with these names who
could participate in the war for us to focus on these names in our analysis.
56See Charnysh and Finkel (2017) for a study of long-term effects of concentration camp locations.
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values. Similarly, using our approach, one could explore the information content and
the prevalence of first-name choices corresponding to prominent generals of the US civil
war or to differentiate Ukrainian and Russian versions of several first names in Ukraine
during its conflict with Russia. Our approach is widely applicable, feasible in many his-
torical settings thanks to the existence of birth certificate records in most countries, and
it lends itself naturally to the study of intergenerational transmission of political values.
Similar to, e.g., Oto-Peralías (in press), our analysis illustrates how, given the scarcity of
political and cultural data at the local level, name choices can provide a valuable source
of information for quantitative empirical analysis in social sciences.
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Tables
Table A1: Predicting Volunteering
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ante 0.0572 0.0434 0.0411 0.0420 0.0397 0.0391
(0.0067) (0.0036) (0.0032) (0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0037)
Other nationalist name 0.0364 0.0243 0.0197 0.0187 0.0253 0.0244
(0.0103) (0.0067) (0.0058) (0.0052) (0.0063) (0.0068)
Top-10 name 0.0152 0.0150 0.0168 0.0057 0.0153
(0.0068) (0.0062) (0.0068) (0.0059) (0.0070)
Siege settlement 0.0486 0.0710 0.0507 0.0785 0.0470
(0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0047) (0.0087) (0.0057)
Ante * Siege settlement 0.0831
(0.0057)
Other nat. name * Siege s. 0.0004
(0.0115)
Top-10 name* Siege s. 0.0168
(0.0157)
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excluding Civil Defence unit Yes
Serbian/Muslim fixed effects Yes
Only all-Croat settlements Yes
N 354,773 354,773 322,706 480,092 225,444 354,773
Notes: Each column corresponds to an OLS regression explaining the binary volunteering
indicator. Bolded coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level based on clustering
at the name level. All specifications control for age-in-years fixed effects, an indicator for
top-10 non-nationalist names in births occurring prior to 1945, and for the following place-
of-birth controls: settlement size, average age, share of employment in agriculture, and share
living abroad, all from the 1991 census. The ‘Other nationalist name’ indicator corresponds
to nationalist names other than Ante.
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Table A2: Predicting Being Killed in Action
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ante 0.0063 0.0103 0.0107 0.0048 0.0103
(0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0009)
Other nationalist name 0.0035 0.0036 0.0033 0.0041 0.0027
(0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0014)
Top-10 name 0.0018 0.0018 0.0019 0.0026
(0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0013)
Siege settlement 0.0188 0.0206 0.0157 0.0181
(0.0042) (0.0038) (0.0082) (0.0059)
Ante * Siege settlement -0.0012
(0.0059)
Other nationalist name * Siege s. 0.0184
(0.0089)
Top-10 name* Siege s. -0.0152
(0.0077)
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Serbian/Muslim fixed effects Yes
Only all-Croat settlements Yes
N 72,586 72,586 96,281 48,462 72,586
Notes: Each column corresponds to an OLS regression explaining the binary indicator of
being KIA during 1991. The sample includes only soldiers drafted during 1991. Bolded
coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level based on clustering at the name level.
All specifications control for age-in-years fixed effects, month-of-service-entry fixed effects,
an indicator for top-10 non-nationalist names in births occurring prior to 1945, and for
the following place-of-birth controls: settlement size, average age, share of employment in
agriculture, and share living abroad, all from the 1991 census. The ‘Other nationalist name’
indicator corresponds to nationalist names other than Ante.
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Table A3: Predicting Nationalist Names for Newborn Boys during 1991-1995
Child name Ante Ante Nationalist Nationalist
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Concentration camp locations -0.049 0.001 0.001 0.006
(0.016) (0.001) (0.011) (0.009)
High-KIA locations 0.004 0.001 -0.001 -0.008
(0.014) (0.002) (0.010) (0.009)
Pre-war share of Antes -0.395 1.092
(0.150) (0.019)
Pre-war share of all nationalist names 0.772 0.959
(0.075) (0.067)
Father named Ante Yes No
Father with any nationalist name Yes No
N 2,353 102,718 28,680 79,288
Notes: Each column corresponds to an OLS regression explaining the binary indicator of a
boy born during 1991-1995 being named Ante or any ‘Nationalist name’ including Ante. Siege
locations are excluded, as are birth certificates with Muslim or Serbian first names. Pre-war
shares of Ante or all nationalist names correspond to the five year period preceding the 1991-
1995 war and are calculated at the municipality level. Bolded coefficients are statistically
significant at the 5% level based on clustering at the municipality level. All specifications
control for municipality size, average age, and share of employment in agriculture.
Table A4: Predicting Candidates’ Shares of Preferential Votes Received by Their Slate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ante 0.056 0.032 0.071 0.042 -0.005 -0.006
(0.018) (0.027) (0.014) (0.027) (0.005) (0.005)
Other Nationalist Name 0.035 0.032 0.030 0.022 0.039 0.043
(0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.033) (0.039)
Ante * Right-Wing Party 0.067 0.088 0.002
(0.050) (0.042) (0.007)
Other Nat. Name * Right-Wing Party 0.005 0.021 -0.012
(0.023) (0.040) (0.024)
Electoral District Affected by War – – Yes Yes No No
N 1,216 1,216 678 678 538 538
Notes: Each column corresponds to an OLS regression explaining the candidates’ share on
the preferential votes received by his slate. Bolded coefficients are statistically significant at
the 5% level based on clustering at the electoral district level. The ‘Other Nationalist Name’




Ethnic Names There are 374 distinct first male names on the Catholic (Croatian) cal-
endar and 275 distinct first male names on the Orthodox (Serbian) name calendar. The
same Christian saints correspond to different versions of the same name on the two calen-
dars, as in Ivan (Croat version) v. Jovan (Serbian version) or Stjepan v. Stefan/Stepan.
35 names appear on both calendars and we do not code these as distinctly national. With
one exception (Marko), all of the top-10 (most frequent) Croatian male names according
to the 2001 census (a set which includes Ante) appear on the Catholic calendar.
81% of Croatian-army veterans have names that appear on the Catholic and/or Or-
thodox calendars. 33,259 of these veterans (7% of all veterans) have names that appear on
both calendars and thus cannot be classified as having either Croatian or Serbian nation-
ality. In sum, 74% (354,773) of Croatian-army veterans have a name that appears only on
the Catholic name calendar and only 0.4% have Orthodox calendar (Serbian) first names.
For completeness, we have also inspected all of the distinct male first names appearing in
the veterans register and identified a subset of 885 names as Muslim. (The most frequent
Muslim names are Samir, Mirsad, Senad, Safet, Muhamed, Ervin, Ismet, Ibrahim, Omer,
and Amir.) Under 2% of veterans have Muslim names. The remaining veterans, i.e.,
those we do not classify as Croat, Serb, or Muslim, typically have non-Yugoslav names
(primarily Italian and English) or have names that appear on both calendars.
Nationalist Names The ‘Other nationalist name’ indicator corresponds to the first
names of the 22 politicians and generals who received the WWII Knighthood of the In-
dependent State of Croatia: Salko Alikadić, Eduard Bunić, Jure Francetić, Franjo Šimić,
Ladislav Aleman, Vilko Begić, Rafael Boban, Matija Čanić, Fedor Dragojlov, Milan Des-
ović, Duro Grujić, Artur Gustović, Slavko Kvaternik, Vladimir Laxa, Vjekoslav Luburić,
Franjo Lukać, Josip Metzger, Ivan Perčević, Krunoslav Perčić, Dragutin Rubčić, Adolf
Sabljak, and Slavko Štancer. Further, we include in the indicator a set of 4 additional
names of the Ustaše leaders who were chiefly responsible for the Holocaust in Croatia:
The “Jewish question” ideologists Andrija Artuković and Mile Budak, and the following
(non-knighted) notorious commanders of concentration camps: Miroslav Filipović and
Dinko Šakić.
All of the nationalist names appear on the Catholic calendar; Ivan and Josip are also
in the top-10 list of Croatian names based on the 2001 census. Josip Metzger, from the
knighted list, was a general and chief organizer of a concentration camp. Ivan Perčević
was one of the leaders of the movement; when Ante Pavelić visited Adolf Hitler, Perčević
was among the small party of Ustaše leaders to accompany him. Both were executed
after WWII. However, both Ivan and Josip have also strong anti-fascist connotations:
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The leader of the Partisan resistance movement and of post-WWII Yugoslavia was Josip
Broz Tito. There are also well-known Partisan leaders called Ivan (e.g., Ivan Rukavina).
It is difficult to define a separate Partisan-name indicator since a large fraction of Partisan
leaders were Serbs. Instead, we provide direct comparisons between the effects of Ante
and both Josip and Ivan in Section 2.4. In the Appendix Figure 1, we also contrast the
evolution of popularity of all male top-10 names according to the 2001 census. Only the
3 top-10 names we refer to as nationalist (Ante, Ivan, and Josip) peak both during WWII
and during the 1991-1995 war.
Name-Type Comparisons In Section 2.4, we compare the 1991-1995 war behavior
of men with nationalist names to that of men with Croatian (Catholic-calendar) names.
The analysis, which covers a relatively short time period, is not sensitive to including all
names and controlling for Muslim- and Serbian-name indicators.
In Section 2.5, we track name patterns for newborns across seven decades, which
raises two issues. First, in ‘siege settlements’, most of which were under Serbian rule for
much of the 1991-1995 war, the share of Serbian and Muslim names given to newborns
is twice higher during the five years preceding the war and four times higher during
the first five years after the war when compared to the share during the five years of
the war. This clearly partly corresponds to the changing ethnic composition of these
locations. Hence, for the purpose of comparing Croatian nationalist-name popularity
across locations, we omit from the analysis in Section 2.5 all newborns with Serbian and
Muslim names. Second, across Croatia and also within all three types of locations we
consider in Section 2.5, the share of (non-Serbian non-Muslim) names that correspond to
the Catholic (Croatian) calendar is declining after 1970. This is related to the increasing
popularity of international (English, Italian) names that do not appear on the traditional
Catholic calendar. We inspected this trend across the sets of locations and found it
to be highly similar both in size and the time pattern. Since our primary goal is to
compare time trends across locations differently affected by war experiences, and since
choosing a name for a newborn boy outside of the Croatian calendar corresponds to
not using a nationalist name, the analysis presented in Section 2.5 is based on using all
name types (other than Serbian and Muslim) to calculate the shares of nationalist names
on each cohort and birthplace type. After excluding the set of newborns with Muslim
and Serbian first names, the main features of Figure ??, which plots the Croatia-wide
evolution of the share of nationalist names, are not materially affected.
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Finally, in Section 2.6 we analyze the name choices for boys born during 1991-1995.
The fathers of these boys can be expected to have been born before the rapid decline in
the use of Catholic names in Croatia; hence, in Section 2.6 we constrain the set of fathers’
names (but not sons’ names) to those that appear on the Catholic calendar (mirroring
the approach used in Section 2.4, where we studied men who were adults in 1991).
2.10.2 Appendix Tables and Figures
Table 2.5: Predicting Volunteering and KIA Across Subsets of Places of Birth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Volunteering
Ante 0.0657 0.0463 0.0575 0.0685 0.0438 0.0645
(0.0051) (0.0084) (0.0049) (0.0044) (0.0077) (0.0078)
Other nationalist name 0.0385 0.0287 0.0341 0.0392 0.0334 0.0184
(0.0102) (0.0125) (0.0115) (0.0097) (0.0117) (0.0119)
KIA
Ante 0.0046 0.0110 0.0132 0.0068 0.0045 0.0159
(0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0022)
Other nationalist name 0.0051 0.0031 0.0061 0.0058 0.0017 0.0038
(0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0026) (0.0028)
Place-of-birth size tercile Low Middle High – – –
Agricultural employment tercile – – – Low Middle High
Notes: The estimates correspond to specifications from column (1) of Table 1 (upper panel)
and Table 2 (lower panel) estimated across terciles of either size (population) or agricultural
share of employment of soldiers’ places of birth. Bolded coefficients are statistically signifi-
cant at the 5% level based on clustering at the name level. All specifications condition on the
following place-of-birth controls: settlement size, average age, share of employment in agricul-
ture, and share living abroad as of 1991. The ‘Other nationalist name’ indicator corresponds
to nationalist names other than Ante.
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Table 2.6: Predicting Child Name Choices by Injured Veterans of the War of Indepen-
dence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Child Name Ante Other Nationalist Name
Unit Death Rate -0.070 -0.0370 -0.097 -0.185
(0.019) (0.012) (0.065) (0.0532)
Father Named Ante 0.008 0.011
(0.013) (0.015)
Father Has Other 0.011 0.021
Nat. Name (0.011) (0.015)
Volunteers Yes Yes
Draftees Yes Yes
N 9,499 4,346 9,499 4,346
Notes: The estimates correspond to OLS regressions explaining the probability of a son of an
injured (but not killed) veteran of the War of Independence born after his father’s war service
being names Ante or any other nationalist name. All specifications control for a step function
in fathers’ age in years and for the following fathers’ place-of-birth controls: settlement size,
average age, share of employment in agriculture, and share living abroad as of 1991. Bolded
coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level based on clustering at the name level.
The ‘Other nationalist name’ indicator corresponds to nationalist names other than Ante.
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Figure 2.7: Cohort Shares of Top-10 Croatian Names
Figure 2.8: WW2 concentration camps areas
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Figure 2.9: WOI High KIA areas




Beyond the Call of Duty: Intergenerational
Transmission of Costs of War
Dejan Kovač and Stepan Jurajda1
Abstract
We ask whether the long-term health costs of combat experience are larger for soldiers ex-
posed to higher risk of dying, i.e., to higher killed-in-action (KIA) rates of their units. We
study the overall mortality effects and also focus on the suicide effects over a 20-year post-
war period using data on all veterans of the 1991-1995 Croatian war for independence.
The length of combat service predicts suicide risks, as does the exposure to psychological
shocks such as the maximum experienced monthly unit-specific KIA rate. In the second
part of the analysis we ask how war-related suicides affect the children of veterans and
find significant negative effects on GPA, school absence and school behaviour. Comparing
the children of soldiers who served within the same unit, we approximate the amount of
psychological shock that each soldier experienced. Subsequently, we analyse the connec-
tion between selection into suicides and children’s outcomes by comparing two groups
of children: those whose fathers died from natural causes and those whose fathers com-
mitted suicide, in the post-war period. We find no differences in children’s GPA across
the two groups,. We find a significant difference in children’s performance on high-stakes
exams, where outcomes can determine future life trajectories. Remarkably, the children
1We would like to thank Janet Currie, James Feigenbaum and Randall Filer for their valuable com-
ments. All mistakes and interpretations are our own. Kovač would also like to thank the Croatian
Ministry of Veterans and Ministry of Public Administration for access to the veteran database and birth
certificate database, respectively.
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of veterans who committed suicide have lower scores on high school state exams than
the children of veterans who died of natural causes. These findings are evidence how
war costs are transmitted from one generation to another and how policymakers should
internalise these unobserved costs into future policymaking.
3.1 Introduction
Wars have long-term costs that reach far beyond their ceasefire date.2 The physical and
mental health consequences of war experiences for soldiers are a critical component of the
overall evaluation of war costs. They are also important for the design of public health
systems in which the prime goal is the long-term health of veterans (e.g., Boscarino, 2006).
The literature on veterans of major armed conflicts highlights the relevance of combat
experience for post-war health outcomes. For example, Cesur et al. (2013) suggest that
deployment to combat zones, and exposure to enemy fire and to death, raise the risk of
suicide ideation in the post-war period. A key feature of combat experience is that of a
military unit, possibly of a small group of co-soldiers with whom one often forms strong
social bonds under fire. Our research allows us to track soldiers who served in the same
unit during different periods and estimate the magnitude of their social bonds as well
as the magnitude of war carnage each person experienced. This is important to proxy
the unit-level exposure to psychological shocks during the war. Charuvastra and Cloitre
(2008) show that individuals exposed to human-generated traumatic events carry a higher
risk of developing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) than those exposed to non-
human generated traumatic events. These studies also consistently identify perceptions
of social support both before and after a traumatic event as an important factor in
determining vulnerability to the development of PTSD. Social ties before the unfortunate
events could mitigate the effects of stress on post-war health thanks to group-based
support. On the other hand, strong social ties may magnify the initial trauma when one
witnesses the death of comrades. These mechanisms relating (extreme) war experiences
among soldiers to their health are of general interest, as stress induced by adverse events
2The literature studies the effects on children’s well-being, human capital investments, the physical
and mental health of civilians, and cooperative behaviour (e.g., Akresh et al., 2012; Ichino and Winter-
Ebmer, 2004; Bauer et al., 2016). For example, Bratti et al. (2015) document significant effects of war
trauma caused by the 1992-1995 Bosnia and Herzegovina conflict on the mental health of survivors in
the general population. Kovac (2017) finds significant negative effects of war-related paternal mortality
on children’s long-run education and health outcomes
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is a key health risk in the general population.3
We study the post-war suicide and overall mortality consequences of the combat
(carnage) exposure of half a million veterans of the Croatian army involved in the 1991-
1995 Croatian war for independence, one of Europe’s bloodiest conflicts since WWII. Our
analysis shows that 97% of these veterans were involved in combat operations, in which
over six thousand soldiers were killed in action (KIA). More than two hundred committed
suicide while on active duty before the end of the war in 1995.
We exploit the complete registry of war veterans that allows us to precisely measure
the nature of their exposure to KIA deaths to determine whether suicide and overall
mortality risks are related to the length of combat service and witnessing of death within
one’s unit during the war. We study all half million veterans of the 1991-1995 Croatian
war for independence from the day they entered the army to the present day. Our
analysis is focused on the effect of trauma on suicide and overall mortality. We find that
monthly KIA rates of soldiers within the same unit as well as days spent in the army
have a strong positive effect on the post-war suicide probability of veterans. Although
the extensive margin of war exposure, i.e. days spent in the army, is highly significant, we
find no differences in the magnitude of the effect by focusing on particular subpopulations
of veterans, such as volunteers and draftees. On the contrary, the intensive margin of
war exposure, i.e. the maximum monthly KIA rate within a unit, exhibits a significant
increase in magnitude when certain subpopulations are included in the analysis. This
provides suggestive evidence that the intensity of psychological trauma experienced in
war is the most important risk factor for suicide. This finding is important from a policy
perspective, since similar military registries are available in every country and one can
easily estimate groups at "high risk" by using a similar methodology.
In the second part of the paper, we ask whether and how these psychological costs
of war transfer to the next generation via families of veterans. We find that the largest
effect is on veterans’ children. The children of veterans who committed suicide after the
war have worse GPA, school behaviour, national exam results and are more often absent
from school than the children of veterans who served in the same unit, but who did not
commit suicide. By comparing the children of soldiers who served within the same unit,
we confine our analysis to veterans who experienced approximately the same amount
3Stress is strongly associated with mental health (including suicide, e.g., Mann, 1998) as well as
physical health (Amick et al. 2002). A large literature investigates whether social networks mediate the
effects of stress (e.g., Bolger and Amarel, 2007; Lett et al. 2007).
103
of psychological shocks. This empirical strategy allows us to estimate how war-related
psychological shocks diffuse through time and what the exact human capital costs are for
the next generation.
Finally, our contribution lies in disentangling the effect of the loss of a parent from
the effect of negative psychological states4 on veterans’ families that precede suicides.
We accomplish this by comparing the educational outcomes of the children of deceased
veterans who served in the same unit, where one group died of natural causes and the
other group committed suicide. In this way both comparison groups are treated with
the loss of a father, and the suicide group is more likely to transfer heavy psychological
states to children. For school behaviour, school absence and GPA we find no difference
in children’s outcomes between these two groups. Additionally, we find that the children
of soldiers who committed suicide perform worse on high-stakes exams than the children
of soldiers who died of natural causes after the war. We cannot say whether this is a
genetic component or behaviour that is transmitted through the nurture of children, but
we show on a subset of observations that the unobserved psychological states of a parent
directly before suicide do not have an effect on children’s educational outcomes.
This study opens a new strand of literature by measuring the long-run intergenera-
tional costs of war on an entire population of half of million veterans and their families.
By tracking veterans and their families almost 20 years after the war, we shed light on
the effect of psychological shocks from war exposure on both veterans and their families.
In terms of human capital accumulation, significant costs of war exposure are visible
even twenty years after the war. These findings may be used as a backbone for post-war
remediation health policies to minimise the suicide rates of veterans and to prevent the
transfer of additional costs to veterans’ families.
3.2 War Exposure
We rely on three indicators of exposure to the carnage of war. First, we know the total
length of combat-operation service for each soldier. On average, the ’at risk’ group served
4Spiegel and Spiegel (1967) investigate the role of affective states preceding suicides and find a severe
presence of alcoholism, self-destructive states and manic-depressive disorders; Hendin, Maltsberger, and
Szanto (2007) find that nine affects - desperation, hopelessness, rage, anxiety, feelings of abandonment,
loneliness, guilt, humiliation, and self-hatred were evaluated as to their intensity in the patient before
the suicide.
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466 days in combat operations during the war.5 Second, we construct two indicators of
death exposure within one’s own unit. During the war, 6,060 Croatian soldiers were killed
in action (KIA). For each soldier involved in combat duty we calculate the maximum
monthly KIA risks experienced by his unit during his combat-operation service.6 On
average, soldiers involved in combat duty experienced maximum monthly unit-specific
KIA death rates of 0.005 (0.5%) with a standard deviation of 0.015. The typical monthly
unit death rates were much lower than the maximum: The soldier-average of median (as
opposed to maximum) monthly unit-specific KIA rates is 0.0005, i.e., ten times lower than
the maximum. For each soldier, the median and the maximum death exposure together
with the length of combat duty provide a coherent picture of the stress generated by KIA
deaths within one’s unit. We need to account for both the intensive and extensive margin
of war exposure, since the literature finds both effects significant.7
A key feature of our analysis is that we compare these effects for volunteers and
draftees. On average, volunteers are likely to be more strongly motivated to fight for
their country than draftees. Volunteers also have more control over their exit from the
service, such that their length of service is likely to be more endogenous than for draftees.
This fact might be important because, according to Skogman et al., (2012), the lack of
a sense of control is an important factor contributing to suicide risks. Both groups had
little control over the maximum death rate they would be exposed to, as this was driven
by unit deployment decisions. The comparison of the effects of maximum death exposure
across the two groups thus speaks to the differences in the mental health effects of war
on two qualitatively different sub-populations. We find relatively little difference in the
estimated effects, suggesting that the endogeneity of volunteering plays little role.
Our analysis builds on and contrasts in its findings with the first long-run exploration
of the health consequences of combat exposure provided by Costa and Kahn (2010), who
find that wartime stress as measured by unit-specific mortality rates during the US Civil
War are related to higher mortality rates conditional on surviving at least 35 years after
5According to http://www.uswings.com/about-us-wings/vietnam-war-facts/ "The length of combat
duty is comparable to average time during Vietnam war, which was 12 months for Army personnel and
up to 13 months for Marines."
6For two soldiers serving in the same unit, their maximum unit-specific death rate will thus differ
depending on in which months of the war the two soldiers were involved in combat duty. Using this
approach we also capture time-varying unit specific war-exposure that a standard fixed effects regression
may not capture.
7 According to King et al. (1999) war-zone stressors appeared preeminent for PTSD in men; Sharkan-
sky et al. (2000) examined relationships between the method of coping with combat-related stress and
psychological symptoms among Gulf War Army personnel and found strong connections depending on
what method of coping soldiers were practicing.
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the war. They also find that men who served in more cohesive companies were less
affected in terms of their mortality by combat-exposure stress. Given that the analysis in
Costa and Kahn (2010) is closely related to ours, it is useful to contrast the two analyses
in detail. First, while Costa and Kahn ask whether the fraction of one’s military unit who
died of wounds in a 19th century war explains the mortality of 7,700 veterans once they
were granted an old-age pension, we study the mortality of almost half a million veterans
during the first 20 years after a modern-era war.8 Hence, our analysis is not affected
by potential survival bias related to the mechanism we are studying. Further, we can
contrast the effects of combat exposure across age groups. Second, Costa and Kahn (2010)
derive a measure of company cohesion based on defection behaviour. This approach is not
available to us, but our data covers the timing of entry into and exit from active duty and
distinguishes volunteers from draftees. It thus allows us to explore dimensions of cohesion
that were not available to Costa and Kahn (2010). Specifically, we contrast the stress
effects of death within one’s unit across cohesion groups corresponding to volunteers vs.
draftees, corresponding to soldiers born in the same region or city, and corresponding
to soldiers who entered the unit in the same month and served together longer. Similar
to the setting in Costa and Kahn (2010), the structure of units as well as their varying
combat exposure in our study is plausibly exogenous. In both analyses, soldiers in more
cohesive units were more likely to be killed in action. While Costa and Kahn (2010) find
that members of more cohesive companies deal with wartime stress better in terms of
their mortality rates in peace-time, we find that losing unit members who are close (in
terms of the volunteer / draftee distinction) worsens the mortality consequences of combat
exposure. Our analysis, unlike that of Cost and Kahn, also highlights the predictive power
of the maximum (monthly) exposure to carnage as opposed to the effect of the overall
death rates in one’s unit during the entire war.
Our data, while substantially larger than that studied by Costa and Kahn (2010), has
two important weaknesses: First, the definition of the units we observe in our data varies
in its aggregation level from platoons to regiments. While this may lower precision,
it should not bias our estimates. Second, we only observe unit assignment as of the
end of the war. Hence, to the extent that soldiers switched units during the war, our
analysis suffers from measurement error. Given the likely presence of attenuation bias,
8 Port, Engdahl, and Frazier (2001) indicated that PTSD symptoms are highest shortly after war,
then decline for several decades to follow, and then again increase when the veteran reaches retirement
age.
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our statistically significant estimates thus may present a lower bound on the total wartime
stress effects. We assess the sensitivity of our results to the unit-assignment measurement
issue by focusing on the subset of soldiers who joined the army in the first (most deadly)
months of the war and left the service within six months of enlisting. Unit switching is
more likely among soldiers serving for up to the full length of the 1991-1995 war and less
likely for the whole army after the spring of 1992, when organised conscription started.
Our analysis significantly extends a growing, mainly US literature on the mental
health effects of combat service. Descriptive evidence is growing on the health correlates
of combat exposure: Kaplan et al. (2007) estimate that men who served in the US
military were twice as likely as were non-veterans to commit suicide, and Blow et al.
(2012) update these results with similar conclusions. Sheffler et al. (2015) uncover poorer
health among US soldiers deployed in combat as opposed to those serving in non-combat
zones. Similarly, Sutker, Allain, and Winstead (1993) and Seal et al. (2009) show that
combat exposure is associated with higher risk of PTSD, and Shen et al. (2009) point
out that the length of combat service is related to mental health.9
Assignment mechanisms determining who is exposed to combat duty and thus to the
main death risks of war, i.e. military service participation and combat deployment, could
potentially be related to soldier unobservables including mental health predispositions.
US studies of the health effects of military service have addressed the endogeneity of
military service by using the draft lottery as an instrument (e.g., Hearst et al., 1986;
Bedard and Deschenes, 2004, Angrist et al., 2011).10 Conditioning on military service and
using a plausibly random source of combat exposure (deployment assignment), Cesur et
al. (2013) show that US soldiers deployed to combat zones since the 1990s and witnessing
deaths had higher risks of suicide ideation. Using a similar strategy, Cesur and Sabia
(2016) show that combat exposure increases the probability of domestic violence.
Unlike all of the existing literature, which is surveyed in more detail in Cesur et al.
(2013) and Sheffler et al. (2015), we employ complete veteran records, i.e., we do not
rely on a survey or a set of patients of a particular hospital. More importantly, we are
uniquely able to precisely measure the extent of carnage witnessed by each soldier. Cesur
and Sabia (2016), who represented the state-of-the-art measurement in the literature,
estimate the effects of combat exposure measured by answering a survey question about
9In closely related work Grieger et al. (2006) study US soldiers who were seriously injured in combat
to link PTSD and depression to the severity of physical problems caused by the injury.
10Card and Yakovlev (2016) represent a recent addition to the literature on conscription effects based
on Russian data and peacetime conscription.
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having experienced incoming fire or having one’s own unit fire on the enemy. In contrast,
we measure the share of one’s unit that perished in the war, and separately for volunteers
and draftees, as the social links and the associated health cost of co-soldier death could
be stronger within these two groups (within units) than across.
3.3 The Croatian War of Independence in Our Data
In 1991 Croatia declared its independence from the Yugoslav federation. The Croatian
war of independence, referred to as the Homeland War in Croatia, was fought from 1991
to 1995 between the Croatian army and the Serb-controlled Yugoslav People’s Army
(JNA) and local Serb forces opposing the secession. During 1991 and 1992, the JNA
conducted combat operations in Croatia and helped establish the Republic of Serbian
Krajina covering the quarter of Croatian territory corresponding to areas with ethnic
Serb majorities. After the ceasefire of January 1992, the front lines were entrenched until
1995 when Croatia launched two offensives known as Operation Flash and Operation
Storm, which effectively ended the war in its favour. Approximately 20,000 people were
killed in the war, most of whom were civilians.11
The Croatian draft was not a lottery, but draft rates were unrelated to recruitment
characteristics other than their military specialisation, which is not observable to us. To
the extent that suicidal tendencies do not differ across military ‘occupations’, one may
consider the draftees a quasi-random sample of the population. Similarly, unit combat
deployment during the Croatian war was not under the control of individual soldiers.
Similar to Hearst et al. (1986), we focus not only on suicide risks, but also on accidental
deaths, which could correspond to either risky behaviour of veterans with mental health
problems or to suicides coded as accidental deaths. Our work is also relevant for the
study of longer-term wellbeing consequences of wars, the Yugoslav wars in particular.
Here, Grubišic-Ilić et al. (2002) find that suicide rates in Croatia were higher in areas
more affected by the war while Shemyakina and Plagnol (2013) study subjective well-
being and find no effect of war exposure on well-being.12
Our primary data source is the registry of military personnel of the Croatian Min-
istry of Veterans, which includes information on 480,094 male soldiers serving during the
11Tabeau and Bijak (2005) illustrate the difficulty of forming estimates of total casualties in the
Yugoslav war.
12Case and Deaton (2015) ask whether suicides correlate with measures of wellbeing.
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war,13 97% of whom were involved in combat operations. During the roughly eight mil-
lion man-months these soldiers spent in active duty during the war, 6,060 (1.3%) were
killed in action (KIA)—a category which in our case includes deaths caused by wounds
sustained in action as well as deaths in captivity.14 We also observe an indicator for being
wounded during the war: 62,336 (13%) of soldiers were wounded. In addition to the KIA
and wounding indicators, which determine veteran benefits available to veterans or their
families, the Ministry of Veterans also collected a suicide indicator for all deaths up to
2015.
3.3.1 Croatian Army Size and Composition
At the start of the war, Croatia had no regular army since the JNA was under Serbian
control. The Croatian army was thus initially formed from volunteers and grew in size
significantly in late 1991, when the regular draft process started based on the registry of
Croatian nationals who had served earlier in the JNA.15 16 The draft did not proceed by
cohorts, but was based on reservists’ expertise from their JNA service.17 In total, there
were 162,268 male volunteers serving during the war and 317,826 draftees.
The heaviest fighting occurred in late 1991 when JNA entered Croatia: 55% of the
6,060 KIA deaths occurred during the first six months of the war. The evolution of
monthly death rates, i.e., of the ratio of soldiers dying in a given month to the number of
active-duty soldiers as of the start of each month, was calculated on aggregate and also
for each particular unit.
The war was at its deadliest in the fall of 1991 when Croatia was under attack and
in August 1995 when it launched Operation Storm. Clearly, soldiers drafted during 1991
13We exclude from the analysis the 5% of female soldiers who all served in non-combat support jobs.
14In total, 9,378 soldiers died during the war. For 7,346 of these we observe the reason for death,
which implies that 5,659 soldiers (77%) were killed in action. We do not know the cause of death for 401
soldiers who died while in active duty. Since three quarters of those who died on active duty during the
war with known types of death were killed on action, we assume that these 401 soldiers were also killed
in action. Deaths in captivity are deaths within concentration camps.
15The Croatian Act of Defense made military service mandatory for all reservist males aged 18 to 65.
Failure to respond to the draft call within 8 days resulted in prosecution and imprisonment. There were
fewer than 2,500 draft avoiders according to local sources. Exemptions from service were possible on
health grounds, but the medical checks were strict and exemptions seldom granted.
16The status of a volunteer is governed by the Croatian Act of Homeland War Veterans. The same
law defines major injury (as opposed to minor injury). Both volunteer and injury status affect welfare
support available to veterans of the Croatian war of Independence.
17The monthly draft inflow into the army remained in the low thousands with the exception of four
months: Over 20 thousand men were drafted in each of the last three months of 1991 as well as in August
1995.
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faced particularly high risk of death. This could be due to selection: volunteers may
be relatively more skilled soldiers, particularly during the first few months of the war.
Further, volunteers joined the army first and served longer; at a given point in time, they
are thus more likely to serve in higher ranks than draftees.18 Unfortunately, our data
does not include rank and this complicates the analysis of KIA death determinants as
rank is generally negatively correlated with the chances of dying in a war. This issue
may, however, be of minor importance in our data given that the draftee and volunteer
death rates converged by the beginning of 1992 and, in particular, given that they were
almost identical towards the end of the war in the two offensives of 1995 as our analysis
shows.
Croatia consists of 21 administrative counties (provinces). Most of the fighting oc-
curred along Croatia’s eastern border. 42% of KIA deaths occurred in the province of
the soldier’s birth; in large part, volunteering and deployment patterns are responsible
for this high share, but it could also be that soldiers are willing to face higher combat
risks when fighting close to home.19
Part of our analysis is based on merging the veterans registry with municipal-level
data from the 1991 Croatian census based on the soldiers’ place of birth. There are 6,759
municipalities divided into 21 counties. These municipalities were affected by the war in a
most uneven fashion. In particular, a set of 177 municipalities was under extended siege by
the JNA during the war, hereafter we refer to these locations as the siege municipalities.20
Given the uneven exposure to the war, it is not surprising that across the 21 counties,
the share of volunteers on all serving army personnel in 1991 and 1992 varied from 6%
to 50%, with an average of 34%.
The number of units in the Croatian army quickly grew from 579 as of July 1991
to about 650 for the remainder of the war. The highest unit-averages of monthly unit-
specific death rates were experienced between September and November of 1991, when
they remained around 0.03. For the remainder of the war, the unit averages of unit
monthly death rates remained below 0.01, with the exception of the summer of 1995.
18The average length of service for soldiers who did not die during the conflict was 932 days for
volunteers and 357 days for draftees. For example, Ante Gotovina, who already had combat experience
in 1991 when he volunteered for the Croatian army, became a leading general during the 1995 Operation
Storm. He was later indicted for war crimes in connection with the operation, but was cleared of the
charges by an appeals panel.
19Almost a quarter of KIA deaths occurred in the province of Vukovar, close to the Serbian border.
Soldiers born in this province also faced the highest KIA risks during the war: almost 4%.
20This set was defined in the Act on Areas of Special State Concern passed on May 17th 1996.
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Excluding units with fewer than 10 soldiers, the Croatian army was composed of
between 282 and 310 units, which, on (unit) average experienced monthly unit-specific
death rates close to 0.03 during September to November of 1991, and below 0.01 for the
remainder of the war. During the heaviest fighting in the fall of 1991, unit-specific death
rates for volunteers were close to 0.01 and dropped to low levels afterwards. However, the
maximum unit-specific death rate among volunteers was 0.37 to 0.70 during the first five
months of the war, and was still as high as 0.27 in month fourteen and remained in single
percentage points subsequently. For draftees, the average unit monthly death rate was
above 0.02 from September to November of 1991 and the maximum of this rate (across
units) was 1.0 until month seven from the start of the war, meaning that all draftees in at
least one unit died that month. Additionally the average monthly unit death rate was at
0.33 in month fourteen, and stayed in single percentage points for most of the following
months.
3.4 War Exposure and Post-War Suicides of Veterans
The first step of our analysis is to test demographic and socio-economic variables before
the war for selection into suicides. The results will help us to determine whether there is
a systematic element that was driving the selection. We do not have many pretreatment
variables at the individual level that could test the hypothesis, but we use Croatian
Census data to approximate the main variables. The War started in late 1991 and we use
the Census data collected immediately before the War. For almost a half million veterans
we observe their place of birth and we are able to match it to the lowest level ZIP code.21
For municipality size, average age in municipality, share of migrants in the municipality,
share of Catholics and Orthodox, we find no statistical difference between soldiers who
committed suicide and those who did not.22 The last two variables are particularly
important since the conflict zones during the war were in areas of high ethnic mixture.
The lack of differences in soldiers’ municipality level characteristics indicates that there
are no idiosyncratic municipality level variables that are driving the selection into suicide.
Since there are no idiosyncratic elements at the municipality level before the war
21We have 6,759 "naselje" geographical units of lowest zip level.
22 We find a statistical difference between the two groups in the share of Croats and Serbs at the
municipality level. Although statistically different, in terms of magnitude the differences are negligible.
Veterans who committed suicide come from municipalities where on average there iare 0.023% more
Serbs and 0.021% less Croats. We also contribute these differences to missing observations both from
the veterans registry and the 1991 Census.
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that might be driving the selection into suicide, our next step is to test the elements
that occurred during the war, such as war exposure. To be able to estimate the effect
of war-related psychological shocks on the post-war probability of veterans’ suicides, we
calculated unit-specific monthly KIA death rates and overall death rates.23 We distinguish
the two because: for a soldier to be psychologically affected, he/she does not have to be
present, but only emotionally attached to a soldier in the same unit to trigger PTSD.
Next, we wanted to have both the intensive and the extensive margin to war exposure, so
we used maximum death rates (KIA and total) as a proxy for the intensive margin and
days in a war as an extensive margin. One soldier might serve in a war for a long period
but experience a small unit-level war carnage, while other soldiers might serve for a very
short period and experience large unit-level war-carnage. In our further analysis we test
both channels, because plausibly both might be significant.
In Table 3 OLS estimates for both the unit maximum death rate and days in war are
positive and significant, 0.028 and 0.002 respectively. After including military unit fixed
effects, the effect of unit level maximum death rate reduces to 0.013, but still remains
highly significant and positive, which supports our hypothesis of the effect of psychological
shocks during the war on post-war suicide probability. The results are very robust to the
inclusion of additional control variables, such as the age of a soldier and whether the
soldier was wounded during the war. We also tested the effect of the unit-level KIA rate
on the probability of suicide and again find a strong and positive relationship. The only
difference between the total death rate and the KIA rate is in the magnitude of the effect,
with the KIA effect being much smaller, at 0.006. This finding is not surprising since
non-KIA deaths cover a larger share of units, and thus the effect is larger.
In Table 4, we ran a series of robustness checks to test the stability of our results.
For our two key variables, unit-level death rates and days spent in the army, we tested
our model on two different subpopulations of soldiers, volunteers and draftees. We find
approximately the same effect on the extensive margin i.e. days spent in the army, 0.002,
while on the intensive margin - the unit’s maximum death rate, although statistically
no difference in estimates there are still large differences in point estimates, 0.058 for
volunteers and 0.008 for draftees. Further, we tested how our estimates change if we
condition on the composition of the unit. This comparison is to see the differences across
units. Soldiers who served in units with a high share of volunteers are more likely to
23These include all types of deaths. The data shows deaths that are non-battlefield, that occured
during war-service, such as car accidents, etc.
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commit suicide than those soldiers who served in units with low shares of volunteers.
The magnitude is almost seven times higher. This is not surprising since volunteers
served longer and most often started their service at the beginning when the fighting was
most severe. FInally, we incorporate the last finding in our analysis and compare soldiers
who served from the fall of 1991 to spring of 1992, i.e., - "early" timing of entry, and find
a much stronger effect than for soldiers who served after that period.
We find that both the intensive and extensive margins of unit-level war exposure
have a positive and a significant effect on the post war probability of suicide. While the
extensive margin, days spent in war, remain unchanged through our robustness checks,
the intensive margin, unit-level max total death rate and KIA rate exhibit differenced in
magnitude. This provides suggestive evidence that the magnitude of psychological shock,
not the duration of war experience, is a decisive factor that affects the probability of a
suicide.
3.5 Intergenerational Costs of War
Besides the direct health and suicide costs of veterans presented in the first part of this
paper, there is an apparent indirect cost of war that transmits to families of veterans. In
this section we focus on the long-run costs of war for families of veterans. Channels of
long-run war effects studied are: war-related suicides and war-related injuries of parents
that might affect children’s long-run human capital accumulation. As shown in Kovac
(2017), losing a father during the war has long-lasting negative effects on children. In
this analysis we focus only on the post-war suicides of veterans. It is evident from the
first part of our analysis that exposure to war carnage has a significant effect on the
post-war probability of a suicide. Since war exposure, and therefore any psychological
costs attached to it, was different across units, we compare outcomes of the children of
fathers who served in the same unit24.
A veteran’s decision to commit suicide might be correlated with family level unobserv-
ables that also influence children’s long run outcomes. For instance, severe psychological
states, such as depression, are often a sign of suicidal intentions25 and the build up to
suicide might influence children’s long run outcomes before the actual death. Our empiri-
24War exposure within the same unit is not considered completely uniform. We provide a series of
robustness checks by comparing soldiers within the same unit, but across dates with high and low battles.
25 Brown et al. (2000) classify the main risk factors that precede suicides: depression, hopelessness
and suicide ideation.
113
cal strategy, aims to disentangle the psychological effects of parental suicide on children’s
outcomes by comparing the children of soldiers who committed suicide and those who
died of natural causes26.
The data used in this part of our research is the registry of the Ministry of Science
and Education that contains all elementary and high school grades for all children in
Croatia for the period 2008-2015. In addition, we used the registry of high school level
national exams of Croatia for 2010-2015. We were able to match these two registries with
the registry of Veterans, which also contains all children of veterans, in order to have
panel data of education outcomes in elementary and/or high school: school GPA, school
absence measured in hours and school behaviour.27 We also observe national high school
graduation exams within a cross-sectional dataset.
3.5.1 Effects of Veterans’ Suicides on Children’s
Educational Outcomes
We have already established significant first order effects of the unit level exposure to
war carnage on the probability of suicide. To explore the second order effects of war
exposure on veterans’ families we use a similar empirical approach. We compare the
educational outcomes of families of veterans who served within the same unit and thus
were exposed to similar risks of dying and injury. Educational outcomes in this part of
the analysis are: GPA per school year, school absence in hours and school behaviour.
Figure 1 illustrates that the children of veterans who committed suicide have worse GPA
than children of surviving soldiers, both injured28 and uninjured. We find similar results
for school absence and behaviour. Next, Table 5 shows that the children of veterans who
committed suicide after the war have 0.192 lower GPA scores than children of veterans
who served in the same unit but did not commit suicide. The results are robust to the
inclusion of additional control variables in Column 2 of Table 5. The negative effect is not
statistically different when comparing elementary and high school GPA, 0.112 and 0.179
26 Dying from natural causes is also non-random and behaviour dependent. Nevertheless, this type
of selection into death potentially has less severe psychological build up than suicide; see Brown et al.
(2000)
27There is no sample selection problem in this part of the research. We are still able to match the whole
population of veterans’ children; the focus is on the younger part who were in education registries at that
time. Children who were not in the registries, because they were too young or too old for elementary or
high school, are still controlled for. We observe them in the registry of Veterans.
28Only the group of children with 100% disabled fathers do not have statistically different GPA than
the group of children who lost their father after the war.
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respectively. Next, we find no statistical difference between the children of volunteers
and draftees who committed suicide, and thus the unobservables that were driving the
selection in the army have no effect. Lastly, we test the effect of civilian war exposure,
and thus column 7 of Table 5 includes only children born after war. The negative effect of
0.127 is not statistically different from our main effect and we can exclude war exposure
as a long-lasting factor in this analysis.
The second educational outcome of our interest is school absence measured in hours
absent a school year. In Table 6, the children of veterans who committed suicide are
20.216 hours more absent than the children of veterans who served in the same unit
and did not commit suicide. In column 2 of Table 6, the inclusion of additional control
variables reduces the coefficient to 19.578, but it is still not statistically different. Column
4 of Table 6 shows that a father committing suicide affects high school aged children more
than it affects those in elementary school. Once again we find no difference in the effect
conditional on the father being a volunteer/draftee or the children being born after war.
The third educational outcome analysed is school behaviour. Table 7 shows that
children whose father committed suicide have on average 0.134 worse school behaviour,
and the results are robust to the inclusion of additional control variables (Column 2).
Interestingly, we find no effect on children in elementary school, but strong effects on
children in high school. The magnitude of the negative effect is the same across volunteer
and draftee fathers, while we find an insignificant effect on children born after the war.
The last educational outcome we consider is national high school exams. Unlike
GPA, national high school exams are standardised country-wide exams that provide an
unbiased measure of knowledge in mandatory and elective courses. Remarkably, through
the majority of robustness checks, we find almost identical results as for GPA. On average,
children whose father committed suicide have 0.134 worse national exam results and 0.158
when additional controls are included. When we compare only mandatory courses we
find no statistical difference from our main estimate, but for elective courses the effect is
much larger, 0.33429. In the case of national exams, we find a significant difference across
volunteer and draftee fathers. The children of draftee fathers have 0.276 worse national
exams results than the children of volunteer fathers. Again, for children born after the
war, we find no effect.
29This result might be driven by selection into elective courses across the suicide and non-suicide group.
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3.5.2 Intergenerational Transmission of the Inability to Handle
Stress
The previous section established a significant effect of father’s suicide on all considered
children’s educational outcomes. In this section, we ask whether a different type of death
of a father has a differential effect on children’s education outcomes. We divide types
of death into suicide and non-suicide30. The reason for this kind of empirical endeavour
is that there is an obvious selection on unobservables into a particular type of death.
Death is a non-random process, where selection into each type of death is correlated with
unobservable variables that might also be affecting children’s educational outcomes. In
our case, severe psychological problems are heralds of suicidal intentions. Our analysis
seeks to determine to what extent these effects transfer to veterans’ families.
The thought experiment is as follows: during the war, veterans were sorted into
units. Each unit had a different level of KIA soldiers and therefore different exposure
to unit-level psychological shocks. We know from the first part of our analysis that the
probability of committing suicide increases with the unit-level KIA rate. After the war,
when comparing soldiers who served within the same unit, some survived and died of
natural causes, while some committed suicide. The underlying research question is -
What makes soldiers who experienced the same amount of war carnage commit suicide
while others do not? Is it a genetic predisposition of inability to handle stress or is it
correlated with family-level unobservable variables? We test whether these traits are
transferred to the next generation.
Table 9 shows the difference between two types of deaths: suicides and non-suicides.
For GPA, school absence, and behaviour we find no difference between type of death
and children’s educational outcomes. On the other hand, we find significant effects on
performance in national exams. The children of veterans who committed suicide perform
0.13 grade points worse on the national exam than the children of veterans who died of
natural causes. We cannot determine whether low performance on high stakes exams is
a result of a genetic inability to handle a stressful situation or whether it is the effect of
unobservable psychological states of a family that precede suicides. To shed some light on
the latter, we compare educational outcomes before and after particular a type of death.
We narrow our analysis to a smaller subset31 of deaths that occurred after 2007 to have
30Non suicide deaths are: died by accident, died in traffic accident and death resulting from illnes.
31There is no sample selection problem. We only focus on the most recent deaths and suicides to have
at least one data point before death.
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before and after measures. If unobserved psychological states that precede suicide are
affecting children’s educational outcomes, we should observe a dip in a year before the
suicide. Figures 2 to 5 show no dip in any of our observed outcomes. In fact, there is
no statistical difference in children’s outcomes across suicide and non-suicide groups for
both before and after death periods. This finding provides suggestive evidence that main
channel of effect might not be in differential treatment from different types of deaths,
but rather an intergenerational component which is transferred genetically or embedded
through upbringing.
3.6 Conclusions
Using a registry of one half million veterans from the Croatian War for Independence,
we asked how war-related psychological shocks, through unit-level KIA and death rates,
affect veterans’ post-war probability of committing suicide. We track soldiers for twenty
years after the war and find that both the length of combat service and maximum expe-
rienced monthly unit-specific KIA rates have a significant and positive effect on suicide
risks. To approximate unified war exposure, we compare soldiers who served within the
same unit and calculate unit-level monthly KIA rates for the set of 650 units to capture
unit-level time varying exposure to psychological shocks. Thus, two soldiers serving in
the same unit, but at different times, can have different exposure to monthly KIA rates.
We find that the magnitude of the effect is five times higher for the maximum experienced
monthly unit-specific KIA rates than it is for the length of combat service, making it the
prevalent factor for post-war suicide risks.
Next, we extend our analysis beyond the first order effects of exposure to war and
research the intergenerational costs of war; how these psychological shocks transfer to the
families of veterans, and in particular, to their children. By comparing the children of
soldiers who served within the same unit, we approximate the amount of psychological
shocks that transfers to the next generation. We find that the children of soldiers who
committed suicide have worse GPA, school behaviour grades, and are more often absent
from school than the children of soldiers who did not commit suicide. Since there is a se-
lection problem into suicides and we do not observe the negative psychological states that
precede suicides, we compare the children of fathers who committed suicide with those
who died. Remarkably, we find no differences between the two groups in GPA, school be-
haviour, and school absence, but significant and large differences in performance on high
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stakes exams, such as national exams. Children of veterans who committed suicide have
worse performance on national high school exams than the children of veterans who died
during the same period of natural causes. Since we compare veterans who served within
the same unit, and thus who were exposed to similar psychological shocks, we cannot
contribute these findings to exogenous events happening during the war, but rather to
endogenous variables that are on the family level. The limited number of suicide deaths
does not allow us to test whether the effect is nature- a lower inability to cope under
pressure transferred through genes or if it is nurture- systematic behavioural patterns
that is transferred through upbringing. Nevertheless, it opens a new venue for future
research.
To our knowledge, this is the first study that tracks the effects of war exposure on such
a large population of veterans and through two separate generations. It also uses a new
methodology to estimate which groups of veterans are at highest risk of suicide. By using a
similar methodology and with the existence of similar registries in numerous countries, our
results are potentially applicable for suicide and mortality prevention programs around
the world, to the extent that veterans were exposed to a similar extent of combat events
and duty length. Finally, in the unfortunate event that suicide prevention is not possible,
policymakers around the world should consider the costs that children bear after the death
and compensate for it through remediation policies. Although few countries practice this
type of policy, it should be implemented by all countries, since for soldiers it is impossible
not to bring your work home.
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Figures
Figure 3.1: Average GPA by mortality and disability status
Note: Died after war include both suicide and non-suicide deaths.
Figure 3.2: Children’s GPA before and after parent’s death
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Figure 3.3: Children’s school absence before and after parent’s death
Figure 3.4: Children’s school behaviour before and after parent’s death
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Figure 3.5: Children’s state exams before and after parent’s death
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Tables
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of war exposure
Soldiers in Croatian Army
Variable name Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Age 480 092 31.258 8.543 17 70
Days in combat 480 092 448.438 492.134 0 1 644
Days in war 480 092 493.324 522.988 1 1 644
Unit max death rate 473 299 0.017 0.058 0 1
Unit max KIA rate 473 299 0.015 0.056 0 1
Volunteers
Unit max death rate 161 021 0.006 0.029 0 1
Unit max KIA rate 161 021 0.006 0.029 0 1
Draftees
Unit max death rate 312 278 0.006 0.029 0 1
Unit max KIA rate 312 278 0.005 0.027 0 1
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Table 3.2: Selection of veterans into suicide by 1991 census - municipality level data of
birth
Soldiers municipality level characteristics by suicide
Non-suicide Suicide
Variable name Obs Mean Obs Mean diff
Municipality size 373 432 122 954.2 542 128 988.1 - 6 033.874
(375.317) (10 490.01)
Average age in municipality 373 565 37.383 542 37.538 - 0.154
(0.005) (0.132)
Share migrated in from abroad 373 176 0.167 542 0.159 0.007
( 0.002) (0.016)
Share of Croats 373 176 0.804 542 0.783 0.021***
(0.001) (0.008)
Share of Serbs 373 176 0.098 542 0.122 - 0.023***
(0.001) (0.007)
Share of Catholics 359 693 0.738 512 0.720 0.018
(0.001) (0.010)
Share of Orthodox 373 176 0.121 542 0.146 - 0.024
(0.001) (0.016)
*Note: Significance at the 10% level is indicated by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***; Discrepancy in number
of observations is in missing observations across variables.
Table 3.3: Unit-level War Exposure and Veterans’ Suicides
Dependent variable: Probability of Suicide
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Unit max death rate 0.028*** 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Days in war in 000 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unit max KIA rate 0.006**
(0.002)
Controls - - - - - yes yes
Unit FE no no yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 429 977 436 423 429 977 436 423 429 977 429 977 429 977
*Note: Significance at the 10% level is indicated by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***;
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Table 3.4: Unit-level War Exposure and Veterans’ Suicides - Robustness Check
Dependent variable: Probability of Suicide
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unit max death rate 0.058** 0.008*** 0.042*** 0.006** 0.058*** 0.004
(0.026) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002)
Days in war in 000 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Unit FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Soldier type volunteer draftee - - - -
Share of volunteers in unit - - high low - -
Timing of entry - - - - early late
Constant 0.001*** 0.001 0.001 0.001*** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 144 539 285 438 109 292 320 643 241 090 188 168
*Note: Significance at the 10% level is indicated by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***;
Table 3.5: Father’s Suicide and GPA
Dependent variable: GPA per school year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Father suicide -0.192*** -0.183*** -0.112*** -0.179*** -0.210*** -0.134*** -0.127***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.030) (0.024)
Controls - yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Unit FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
School type all all elementary high school all all all
Father type all all all all volunteer draftee all
Born after war all all all all all all yes
Constant 3.773*** 4.440*** 4.469*** 4.086*** 4.408*** 4.494*** 4.570***
(0.001) (0.011) (0.014) (0.200) (0.014) (0.020) (0.014)
Observations 165 731 165 731 98 028 67 703 114 778 50 953 110 925
*Note: Significance at the 10% level is indicated by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***; SE are clustered at
unit level.
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Table 3.6: Father’s Suicide and School Absence
Dependent variable: School Absence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Father suicide 20.216*** 19.578*** 13.420*** 21.499*** 17.136*** 23.815*** 14.234***
(1.586) (1.581) (1.718) (2.641) (2.083) (2.497) (1.776)
Controls - yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Unit FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
School type all all elementary high school all all all
Father type all all all all volunteer draftee all
Born after war all all all all all all yes
Constant 58.003*** 28.818*** 30.884*** 78.208*** 29.944*** 28.129*** 24.987***
(0.379) (0.982) (0.981) (1.924) (1.206) (1.728) (1.044)
Observations 164 085 164 085 95 253 68 832 113 546 50 539 108 969
*Note: Significance at the 10% level is indicated by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***; SE are clustered at
unit level.
Table 3.7: Father’s Suicide and School Behavior
Dependent variable: School Behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Father suicide -0.107*** -0.099*** -0.020 -0.126*** -0.098*** -0.104*** -0.023
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.025) (0.019) (0.022) (0.015)
Controls - yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Unit FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
School type all all elementary high school all all all
Father type all all all all volunteer draftee all
Born after war all all all all all all yes
Constant 2.842*** 3.146*** 3.120*** 2.620*** 3.128*** 3.181*** 3.153***
(0.003) (0.008) (0.007) (0.018) (0.010) (0.014) (0.008)
Observations 160 136 160 136 92 305 67 831 111 424 48 712 105 307
*Note: Significance at the 10% level is indicated by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***; SE are clustered at
unit level.
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Table 3.8: Father’s Suicide and High School State Exams
Dependent variable: State Exam Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Father suicide -0.134*** -0.158*** -0.128** -0.334*** -0.127** -0.276*** -0.022
(0.044) (0.045) (0.049) (0.094) (0.056) (0.076) (0.112)
Controls - yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Unit FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Course all all mandatory elective all all all
Father type all all all all volunteer draftee all
Born after war all all all all all all yes
Constant 3.104*** 2.647*** 2.747*** 2.329*** 2.603*** 2.735*** 2.834***
(0.012) (0.030) (0.034) (0.059) (0.036) (0.057) (0.176)
Observations 48 879 48 879 35 203 13 676 35 978 12 901 9 578
*Note: Significance at the 10% level is indicated by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***; SE are clustered at
unit level.
Table 3.9: Types of Father’s Death and Educational Outcomes
Dependent variables:
GPA Absence Behaviour State exams
Father suicide -0.004 1.650 0.008 -0.130**
(0.023) (2.390) (0.020) (0.056)
Controls yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Unit FE yes yes yes yes
Constant 3.840*** 75.477*** 2.860*** 2.820***
(0.021) (2.199) (0.017) (0.051)
Observations 8 302 8 356 8 020 2 273
*Note: Significance at the 10% level is indicated by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***; SE are clustered at
unit level.
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